Encoding of and memory for expectancy congruent and incongruent information: structural and process characteristics by Oelsner, Sven
  
 
 
ENCODING OF AND MEMORY FOR EXPECTANCY CONGRUENT AND INCONGRUENT 
INFORMATION 
 
Structural and process characteristics 
 
 
 
Dissertation  
zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades  
doctor philosophiae (Dr. phil.)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vorgelegt dem Rat der Fakultät  
für Sozial- und Verhaltenswissenschaften  
der Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena  
von Dipl.-Psych. Sven Oelsner  
geboren am 25.06.1975 in Naumburg / Saale 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gutachter:  
 
1. Prof. Dr. Thorsten Meiser 
2. Prof. Dr. Melanie Steffens 
 
Tag des Kolloquiums: 12. Februar 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dimidium facti, qui coepit, habet: sapere aude, incipe. 
 
Horaz 
 
 
 
Contents 
1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 5 
2 Structural components of stereotyping ............................................................................... 8 
2.1 Schema based impression formation: stereotypes and stereotyping .......................................... 8 
2.2 Memory for inconsistent information and cognitive capacity .................................................... 9 
2.3 A cognitive miser seeking meaning? ......................................................................................... 11 
2.4 The encoding flexibility model (EFM) ...................................................................................... 13 
3 Procedural components of stereotyping ............................................................................ 17 
3.1 Individuation and inconsistency resolution .............................................................................. 17 
3.2 Tests and extensions ................................................................................................................... 18 
3.3 Stereotyping as continuously adapted permanent anticipation ................................................ 19 
3.4 Conclusion .................................................................................................................................. 23 
4 The role of encoding flexibility in search for meaning .................................................... 25 
4.1 Main Hypotheses ........................................................................................................................ 25 
4.1.1 Hypothesis concerning the memory for perceptual details of inconsistent information .......... 25 
4.1.2 Hypothesis concerning the diminishing of the inconsistency effect ........................................ 25 
4.1.3 Hypothesis concerning the automaticity of the attention allocation process. .......................... 25 
4.2 Overview of the experiments ...................................................................................................... 25 
5 Experiments ......................................................................................................................... 27 
5.1 Multinomial Models ................................................................................................................... 27 
5.2 Experiment 1 .............................................................................................................................. 30 
5.2.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 30 
5.2.2 Method ..................................................................................................................................... 33 
5.2.3 Results and discussion ............................................................................................................. 37 
5.2.4 Summary .................................................................................................................................. 41 
5.3 Experiment 2 .............................................................................................................................. 43 
5.3.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 43 
5.3.2 Method ..................................................................................................................................... 44 
5.3.3 Results and discussion ............................................................................................................. 49 
5.3.4 Summary .................................................................................................................................. 52 
5.4 Experiment 3 .............................................................................................................................. 54 
5.4.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 54 
5.4.2 Method ..................................................................................................................................... 56 
5.4.3 Results and discussion ............................................................................................................. 62 
 
 
5.4.4 Summary .................................................................................................................................. 65 
5.5 Experiment 4 .............................................................................................................................. 68 
5.5.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 68 
5.5.2 Method ..................................................................................................................................... 69 
5.5.3 Results and discussion ............................................................................................................. 70 
5.5.4 Summary .................................................................................................................................. 72 
6 General discussion ............................................................................................................... 73 
6.1 Overview ..................................................................................................................................... 73 
6.2 Strengths and limitations of the presented experiments ........................................................... 79 
6.3 Theoretical links to stereotype change research ....................................................................... 80 
6.4 Future research .......................................................................................................................... 81 
6.5 Conclusion .................................................................................................................................. 82 
Summary ................................................................................................................................. 98 
Zusammenfassung ................................................................................................................ 100 
Appendix ............................................................................................................................... 102 
Ehrenwörtliche Erklärung .................................................................................................. 120 
 
5 
 
1 Introduction 
 
In social cognition stereotyping is investigated from metaphorical, structural and procedural 
perspectives. Lippmann (1998, p. 73) described stereotypes metaphorically as  
 
 
“an ordered, more or less consistent picture of the world, to 
which our habits, our tastes, our capacities, our comforts and 
our hopes have adjusted themselves. They may not be a 
complete picture of the world, but they are a picture of a 
possible world to which we are adapted. In that world people 
and things have their well-known places, and do certain 
expected things. We feel at home there. We fit in. We are 
members. We know the way around. There we find the charm 
of the familiar, the normal, the dependable; its grooves and 
shapes are where we are accustomed to find them. And though 
we have abandoned much that might have tempted us before 
we creased ourselves into that mould, once we are firmly in, it 
fits as snugly as an old shoe.” 
 
 
Recent social psychological research confirms the first phenomenological description 
of stereotypes by Lippmann predominantly in describing them now as beliefs about the 
connections of attributes with categories (Allport, 1954; Bodenhausen & Macrae, 1998; 
Stangor, 2000) or mental representations with associative structures containing nodes for 
category labels, prototypical group members, exemplars and other nodes for the attributes 
(Bless, Fiedler, & Strack, 2004) of groups or individuals, such as traits (Macrae, Stangor, & 
Milne, 1994) and typical behaviours (van Knippenberg & Dijksterhuis, 2000). Other 
procedural definitions understand stereotypes as “energy-saving devices” (Macrae, Milne, & 
Bodenhausen, 1994; see Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2001, for a review), as cognitive “tools that 
jump out of the toolbox when there is a job to be done” (Gilbert & Hixon, 1991) or a “knife 
that cuts both ways” because it inhibits access to inconsistent information and facilitates the 
access to consistent information (Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg, 1996). In short, 
stereotypes are considered as a flexible tool for handling the incomprehensible information 
amount in the real world, particularly when cognitive resources are depleted (e.g. Sherman, 
Lee, Bessenoff, & Frost, 1998), inter alia because meta-analyses (Rojahn & Pettigrew, 1992; 
Stangor & McMillan, 1992) and relevant investigations found advantages for inconsistent 
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information in memory under certain circumstances particularly under conditions of cognitive 
load (e.g. Sherman, Conrey, & Groom, 2004; Ehrenberg & Klauer, 2005).  
Despite the high amount of elaborate theories, models, and experimental findings in 
stereotyping research the crucial question why the perception of stereotype-inconsistent 
information does not challenge a stereotype is not yet answered. Why is a belief, or 
conviction about the relation between categories and attributes so strong that a general 
schema is not altered even in the face of a huge amount of disproving evidence? One way to 
understand this phenomenon is the investigation of the encoding and memory processes for 
expectancy incongruent information.  
Reasons that why exposition to stereotype-inconsistent information does not lead to 
immediate stereotype change may be found in several antecedents and characteristics of the 
perception process for inconsistent information. Different amounts of cognitive capacity, the 
nature and variety of the stereotype-consistent and inconsistent information, and processing 
instructions are promising fields for the investigation of process characteristics (Rojahn & 
Pettigrew, 1992; Stangor & McMillan, 1992).  
Influential impression formation models (Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990) 
assume increased individuation as a consequence of continued individual impression 
formation and less reliance on categorical-stereotypical schemas in cases where motivational 
or informational reasons make it worthwhile to carry on with the individual impression 
formation process. However, there is next to no direct investigation of the time course of 
stereotyping and its potential dissipation with enhanced individuation so far (Kunda, Davies, 
Adams, & Spencer, 2002).  
Furthermore, in these theories it is assumed that individuation is a very resource 
consuming process which is abandoned under conditions of scarce cognitive resources or lack 
of motivation – hence supporting stereotyping. On the other hand there are also studies which 
report no influence of cognitive load on the social categorisation process whatsoever (Nolan, 
Haslam, Spears, & Oakes, 1999) and rather propose a flexible encoding strategy adapted to 
varying mental resources. In studies concerning the encoding flexibility hypothesis (Sherman 
et al., 1998) it was assumed and found (Sherman et al., 2004) that under conditions of scarce 
cognitive resources the conceptual encoding of consistent information is enhanced whereas 
perceptual encoding is shifted towards contextual details of inconsistent information 
(Ehrenberg & Klauer, 2005; Wigboldus, Sherman, Franzese, & van Knippenberg, 2004).  
If cognitive load does not necessarily lead to more stereotyping in general and 
consequentially not to the ignorance of stereotype-inconsistent information and its contextual 
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details – then why does stereotype-inconsistent information not change the stereotype? One 
answer may be recategorisation as permanent update of expectations in the face of poorly 
fitting behavioural information within a social category during an impression formation 
process. In the sense a stereotype is not a useful “tool”, that is abandoned if not needed, but 
rather an inevitable prerequisite of information processing. Furthermore, the alteration of the 
stereotyping process itself does not so much depend on the stereotype that has to be changed 
but on the variety of stereotype relevant information and the ability to shift from one 
stereotypical expectation to another.  
The present study attempts to show that an initial difference in memory for perceptual 
details of stereotype-consistent and inconsistent information is diminished during the 
impression formation process, even under cognitive load, as a consequence of expectation 
adaptation processes.  
Four experiments will be presented that investigated the encoding, memory, and time 
course for stereotype-consistent and inconsistent information under cognitive load conditions. 
All participants were presented with equal numbers of consistent, inconsistent, and neutral 
behaviour descriptions about stereotypically labelled target persons (physician and/or 
prostitute). The results support the assumption that the presentation of contextual details 
together with inconsistent information under conditions of cognitive load leads to a memory 
advantage for these contextual details. The initial disadvantage for consistent contextual 
information compared to inconsistent information is mostly diminished in the last phase of the 
impression formation process. The relevance of these findings for approaches concerning 
change of beliefs will be discussed concludingly. 
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2 Structural components of stereotyping 
 
2.1 Schema based impression formation: stereotypes and stereotyping 
 
The theories, models and experimental evidence in favour of stereotype-based 
encoding, processing, memory, and judgement of information are numerous. Early theoretical 
assumptions proposed a cognitive miser in processing stereotypical information (Fiske & 
Taylor, 1984), meaning a perceiver with the motivation to prevent any inconvenient changes 
within its cognitive system. But empirical evidence for advantages of inconsistent information 
and the theoretical necessity of an adaptive strategy of the cognitive system inspired later 
researchers to coin metaphors such as “strategic tactician” (Fiske & Taylor, 1991), “efficiency 
expert” or “energy-saving devices” regarding more flexible encoding and retrieval processes 
(Macrae et al., 1994; see: Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2001 for a review). The development of a 
differentiated view on stereotype-consistent and inconsistent information was accompanied 
by several studies using special cognitive load manipulation (i.e. Bodenhausen, 1990; 
Bodenhausen & Lichtenstein, 1987; Gilbert & Hixon, 1991; van Knippenberg, Dijksterhuis, 
& Vermeulen, 1999; Macrae et al., 1994; Sherman et al., 1998; see also: Nolan et al., 1999 for 
a review) with the attempt to discard advantages for inconsistent information and to show that 
the encoding, processing, and retrieval of inconsistent information is a resource consuming 
process.  
These studies underlined the assumption that under cognitive load participants were 
more inclined towards perception, memory and judgement of stereotype-consistent 
information and these results led to the belief that stereotypes are cognitive “tools that jump 
out of the toolbox when there is a job to be done” as (Gilbert & Hixon, 1991, p. 510) stated. 
   Stereotyping in these studies was understood as a collective term for several aspects 
of processing advantages for stereotype-consistent information. Among these were for 
instance facilitation of concurrent tasks while perceiving stereotype-consistent information 
(Macrae et al., 1994), as better memory for consistent information (Dijksterhuis & van 
Knippenberg, 1995; Macrae, Hewstone, & Griffiths, 1993), the variability of judgement of a 
defendant’s guilt according to his or her membership in an inauspiciously stereotyped group 
(van Knippenberg, Dijksterhuis, & Vermeulen, 1999; Bodenhausen & Lichtenstein, 1987). 
Some of these and their own findings led Dijksterhuis and Knippenberg (1996) to state that a 
stereotype is a “knife that cuts both ways” because it inhibits access to inconsistent traits and 
facilitates the access to consistent traits. This hypothesis is further supported by studies 
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concerning spontaneous trait inferences (Wigboldus et al., 2004; Wigboldus, Dijksterhuis, & 
van Knippenberg, 2003). These studies found that while observing a behaviour (or rather, by 
reading a certain behaviour description) a trait is spontaneously inferred. This spontaneous 
trait inference has been shown to become inhibited if an inconsistent stereotypical category 
label was presented previously by Wigboldus and colleagues (2003). 
However, despite all the facts in favour of stereotype-consistent information 
processing, a niche was left for processing advantages of inconsistent information. It is to 
some extend ironic, that these advantages for inconsistent information can be found especially 
under cognitive load conditions (see Sherman et al., 1998).  
 
2.2 Memory for inconsistent information and cognitive capacity 
 
Findings of investigations concerning advantages for stereotype-inconsistent 
information (Vonk & van Knippenberg, 1995; Srull, 1981; Belmore & Hubbard, 1987; 
Higgins & Bargh, 1987; Hamilton & Sherman, 1994; Srull, Lichtenstein, & Rothbart, 1985; 
Stangor & Duan, 1991; Wyer & Gordon, 1982) gain additional support from meta-analytical 
studies concerned with memory for expectancy congruent and incongruent information 
(Rojahn & Pettigrew, 1992; Stangor & McMillan, 1992). These meta-analyses illustrate how 
expectancy-incongruent information tends to be better remembered. However, they revealed 
several accompanying conditions: The inconsistency advantage is more likely to occur if an 
impression formation task – as opposed to a memory task – is introduced and if recognition 
memory measures were cleansed of guessing biases. Moreover, a retention interval, behaviour 
descriptions instead of traits, and less cognitive load (reduced information complexity and 
time pressure) further support substantially better memory for inconsistent information.  
Most of the existing theories regarding categorization, stereotyping, and schematizing 
understand the encoding of information as resource consuming process (Norman & Bobrow, 
1975), which typically benefits consistent information because inconsistent information 
requires deeper processing to be remembered (Macrae, Bodenhausen, Schloerscheidt, & 
Milne, 1999; Brewer, 1988; Fiske, Lin, & Neuberg, 1999; Garcia-Marques & Hamilton, 1996; 
Hastie & Kumar, 1979). Consequently, further investigations found better memory for 
consistent information under conditions of cognitive load (Pendry & Macrae, 1999; Macrae et 
al., 1999; Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg, 1995; van Knippenberg, Dijksterhuis, & 
Vermeulen, 1999; Macrae et al., 1993) seemingly supporting the cognitive-miser-assumption 
(Fiske & Taylor, 1984; Sherman, Macrae, & Bodenhausen, 2000).  
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An opposing perspective on stereotypical information processing is proposed by 
representatives of the meaning-seeker-assumption (Nolan et al., 1999; Oakes & Turner, 1990; 
Spears & Haslam, 1997; Oakes, Haslam, & Turner, 1994). Categorization and stereotyping 
are not seen as tools, more or less at hand in order to save scarce cognitive resources, but as a 
necessary prerequisite of social perception, memory and judgement. In this argument, 
stereotyping is understood as a function of the accessibility of particular categories and the fit 
of the given information with the category. Social perceivers on the other hand are considered 
as guided by their desire to be as accurate as possible in their perceptions rather than being 
most efficient. One important prediction resulting from these assumptions is the desire to 
make sense and find meaning, which trumps the desire to save cognitive resources in general.   
Nolan and colleagues (Nolan et al., 1999) explicitly discussed alternative explanations 
of the effects relying on a “sense making device” instead of an “energy-saving device” 
concept (Macrae et al., 1999). Also referring to previous arguments by Oakes and Turner 
(1990; Oakes et al., 1994) Nolan and colleagues explain the reduction of the amount of 
information intake not as the primary function of stereotyping but as a side effect, which is 
understood as quite redundant. Nolan and colleagues argue that it is not the information 
overload that is so challenging for the social perceiver but the ambiguousness and 
equivocality of the social world. From their perspective the social perceiver mainly aims at 
establishing socially accurate mental representations of the world instead of trying to be more 
cognitively efficient. After pointed criticism of the common experimental paradigm in the 
assessment of stereotype consistency advantages under scarce cognitive resources - the 
presentation of stereotype-consistent and inconsistent information and the subsequent test of 
different memory advantages – Nolan and colleagues elaborated on their use of the well tested 
“Who said what?” category confusion task (Taylor, Fiske, Etcoff, & Ruderman, 1978), where 
participants have to form impressions of people engaged in a group discussion and 
subsequently have to match target names or pictures with behaviour descriptions presented on 
the stimulus tape recording. More intra-category errors than inter-category errors are 
considered an indication for stronger stereotyping. As expected, Nolan (1999) found no load 
effects or even opposite load effects on category errors, that is to say under conditions of 
cognitive load categorization decreased.  
Additionally, Klauer and Wegener (1998) and Klauer and Ehrenberg (2005) also 
illustrated that categorization in the “Who said what?” paradigm is largely unaffected by 
cognitive load, which could be interpreted as further support for the meaning-seeker- 
assumption.  
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2.3 A cognitive miser seeking meaning? 
 
From what has been said so far two crucial questions inevitably arise: What exactly is 
stereotyping? Is stereotyping the motivation-dependent application of a flexible resource 
keeping tool or is it an unavoidable but adaptive category-based impression formation 
necessity? 
Some aspects of the persistent argument between the two main traditions explaining 
stereotyping may be based on a confusion of terms. On the one hand stereotyping is described 
as the application of “flexible and efficient tools” (Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg, 1996; 
Macrae et al., 1994; Gilbert & Hixon, 1991) – a theory rooted in the cognitive-miser- 
supposition and later on (Fiske & Taylor, 1984) transformed into the efficiency-experts- 
assumption (Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2001; Sherman et al., 2000; Sherman et al., 2004).  
On the other hand the meaning-seeker-hypothesis (Nolan et al., 1999; Oakes & 
Turner, 1990; Spears & Haslam, 1997) rooted in the social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 
1979) was postulated, which implies the particular helpfulness of categorisation and 
stereotyping in coping with too little rather than too much information (Medin, 1988).  
Efficiency experts are understood as equipped with several motivations that lead – 
depending on the situation – to stereotyping. Cognitive load is considered an interference with 
effortful, resource-dependent mental processes, such as individuation and inconsistency 
resolution, and thus supporting stereotyping. This view in no way contradicts the original 
cognitive-miser-assumption, but specifies it (Sherman et al., 2000). While forming 
impressions of people cognitively very busy perceivers rely on already pre-chewed models of 
the social world in order to enable them to achieve other than non-resource-saving-goals 
(Macrae et al., 1994).  
There are many dual process models of information processing in social and cognitive 
psychology with the same intention to classify effortful and effortless cognitive procedures 
and group them into different categories: automatic, associative, heuristic, intuitive, 
schematic, stereotypic, categorical, experiential, and impulsive thinking vs. systematic, 
individually, corrective, suppressive, rational, rule-based, and reflective thinking (Epstein, 
1991; Fazio, 1986; Strack & Deutsch, 2004; Chaiken, 1980; Devine, 1989; Sloman, 1996; see 
Smith & DeCoster, 2000; for a review). They all share the assumption of a complex cognitive 
system that uses flexible adaptive processes.  
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Does stereotyping imply a shift towards automatic, associative, and heuristic thinking 
under cognitive load even when there is a lot of motivation for rational rule based, systematic 
thinking available? However, stereotyping can also occur within a systematic thinking. 
Stereotypes themselves may not be resource saving tools. There can also be a very systematic, 
highly elaborated, stereotypical framework that is based on rational, thorough considerations 
and reflects a set of rules. Consequentially, stereotyping can be seen as a kind of systematic 
thinking and not opposed to it. Generally speaking, there is a difference between the processes 
and the contents involved in stereotyping. The contents of cognitive processes, which are 
themselves very resource consuming and easily depleted by cognitive load (i.e. inconsistency 
resolution), can be very sophisticated, depending on the degree of experience and previous 
elaboration. On the other hand inconsistency resolution and individuation can be less resource 
consuming depending on the ability to shift the stereotypical frame, on the amount of 
available alternative opportunities and the training experience in inconsistency resolution and 
individuation. 
Therefore, meaning seekers can be understood as functioning according to their 
primary motivation to create understanding. Stereotyping can be seen as a similarly effortful 
process as individuation, which is included in the assumption that categorization is an 
inevitable component of human information processing (Spears & Haslam, 1997). In contrast 
to the continuum model (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990) – which implies less categorisation at some 
level – it could be stated that all perception and cognition is categorical, which follows ideas 
developed by no other than the philosophical giant Immanuel Kant. 
In their review of the debate between efficiency experts and meaning seekers Sherman, 
Macrae, and Bodenhausen (2000) clarified their view on the dispute: That – from their 
perspective – there is no dispute. Nevertheless, their views on social perception resulted in the 
formula “systematic thinking = f (motivation x capacity)” (Bodenhausen, Macrae, & 
Sherman, 1999, p. 276). Spears and Haslam (1997) as well as Oakes and Turner (1990) did 
not put it less bluntly: According to them stereotyping is a cognitive operation that creates 
meaning in the ongoing process of social reality computing and not a flexible process of 
applying simplifying, pre-established structures in order to save cognitive capacity. Spears 
and Haslam found no persuasive evidence supporting the cognitive-miser-assumption. Even 
large scale manipulation of cognitive load does not necessarily imply that a lack of capacity 
results in less systematic thinking. Consequentially, the above formula may be restated as 
“systematic thinking = f (motivation + capacity)”.  
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Furthermore, Gilbert and Hixon (1991) contributed to this discussion by reporting 
evidence suggesting that – firstly – automaticity of stereotype activation is impeded by 
cognitive load and – secondly – that stereotype application – once the stereotype is activated – 
is facilitated. The “Who said what” paradigm, used by the meaning-seeker-attorneys Nolan 
and colleagues (1999), is a method highly suitable for the investigation of the spontaneous 
activation and subsequent application of social categories to a group of different people 
belonging to different primary social categories. On the other hand, the stereotype-priming-
paradigm, used by efficiency-experts-representatives like Macrae and colleagues (Macrae et 
al., 1994), is very useful for the investigation of the application of previously primed 
stereotypical labels to subsequent behavioural information of single target person. This 
paradigm is also known for its facilitation of memory for stereotype-consistent information. 
Both assumptions (meaning seeker vs. efficiency experts) are general hypotheses and not 
restricted to special paradigms of investigation (“Who said what” paradigm vs. stereotype-
priming-paradigm). If the meaning-seeker-assumption is valid, then the assumption that social 
categorisation is primarily motivated by the fit of behaviour and social category (and not by 
cognitive load) must also apply to paradigms with previously primed stereotypes. If – on the 
contrary – the perceiver is an efficiency expert, cognitive load should be a major force behind 
inhibition of any recategorisation or individuation attempts.  
  
2.4 The encoding flexibility model (EFM)    
 
Another solution for the contradictory findings of the memory advantage for 
inconsistent information, both under cognitive load and no load lies in dynamical processes 
that favour memory for consistent and inconsistent information under cognitive load alike. 
Sherman and colleagues (Sherman et al., 1998, p. 591) argued that “the efficiency of 
stereotypes lies in their ability to facilitate, in different ways, the encoding of both, expected 
and unexpected behaviours when capacity is low” and that “as processing capacity is 
depleted, consistent information enjoys relatively greater conceptual encoding than 
inconsistent information. At the same time, attention and perceptual/contextual encoding 
(encoding of the physical details and contextual specifics of the stimulus) shift away from 
consistent and toward inconsistent information.” (Sherman et al., 2004, p. 216; see also: 
Sherman, 2001).  
In a series of experiments Sherman and colleagues (1998) tested these assumptions. 
They presented their participants with the same amount of stereotype-consistent, stereotype-
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inconsistent, and neutral behaviour descriptions about one of two stereotyped target persons, a 
skinhead or a priest. They were able to show that reading times for inconsistent items were 
significantly longer under conditions of cognitive load and response frequencies to tones 
emitted during the presentation of consistent and inconsistent behaviours were higher for 
inconsistent items than for consistent items under load, but not so in low load conditions. All 
in all this indicates greater attention achievement for inconsistent information (or less for 
consistent information) with limited cognitive resources. Moreover, they found a better 
memory for inconsistent items if consistent and inconsistent items directly competed with 
each other for attention because of their simultaneous presentation under load. These results 
were interpreted as supporting the attention shift assumption. Sherman et al. argue that 
experimental constraints prohibit the usage of explicit measures with expectancy tasks 
because of suspected intentional, expectancy-based reconstruction processes as a consequence 
of the conceptual “contamination” of the material. Consequently, Sherman and colleagues 
carried out a perceptual priming task, where briefly flashed stereotype-consistent and 
inconsistent words – previously presented on a list of behaviour descriptions – had to be 
identified. They found better identification results for inconsistent information, which was 
interpreted as support for the assumption that inconsistent information receives more 
perceptual encoding. That this inconsistency advantage in word identification also held true 
for the no load condition was illustrated with findings of generally less affectability of 
perceptual encoding by cognitive load. In a final trait recognition task Sherman et al. found 
higher identification of consistent traits related to behaviour descriptions perceived in the 
presentation phase. Sherman and colleagues took these results again as support for their 
hypothesis of conceptual fluency and attention flexibility. 
 In a revisit (Sherman et al., 2004) of the study by Sherman et al. (1998) a significantly 
enhanced selection of inconsistent probe items compared to consistent probe items under 
conditions of low cognitive capacity was found. With sufficient resources available the effect 
was inverted: Consistent probe items were chosen significantly more often than perceptually 
comparable ones. Sherman et al. used a recognition task, where participants had to identify 
graphemically similar words to words shown in the presentation phase. These probe words 
were conceptually unrelated to the target words which were presented in sentences like 
“Didn’t help the short lady reach for an item on the top of the shelf”. Then the word “shell” 
being similar to the word shelf, had to be identified from a list of 50 probe words. The target 
sentences were presented on the left and the right hand side of the screen in a combinations of 
12 pairs of behaviour descriptions (consistent/inconsistent (4) consistent/irrelevant (4) and 
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inconsistent/irrelevant (4)). All pairs of behaviour descriptions were shown in a short 
presentation interval (3 seconds) in order to provoke direct attention competition between 
consistent and inconsistent items. The priming procedures used by Sherman and colleagues 
allow the investigation of short-term-attention reallocation processes, but not the examination 
of episodic long-term memory, where the physical details and contextual specifics of the 
stimulus are expected to be encoded, as well.  
  Support for the conceptual part of the EFM also comes from research concerning 
spontaneous trait inferences (STI), where these inferences for stereotype-inconsistent 
information were particularly impaired by cognitive load (Wigboldus et al., 2003; Wigboldus 
et al., 2004). This is of special interest because recent research in STI shows that the trait 
inference process is neither enhanced nor depleted by changing cognitive capacity, but is an 
almost inevitable component of impression formation (Crawford, Skowronski, Stiff, & 
Scherer, 2007; see also Winter, Uleman, & Cunniff, 1985). Wigboldus and colleagues (2004) 
presented their participants with trait-implying behavioural descriptions such as “X hits the 
saleswoman” that were either consistent or inconsistent with a particular stereotype 
previously presented. After reading the sentence, participants were presented with trait probe 
words (“aggressive”) and instructed to indicate as fast and precisely as possible whether the 
exact word had been presented before. On average half of the participants who were placed 
under cognitive load needed on average more time to reject consistent trait probe words than 
inconsistent trait words. This result was interpreted as facilitation of spontaneous trait 
inferences with the aid of stereotypes under cognitive load. Within the framework of the EFM 
these results indicate the accuracy of the assumption that stereotype-consistent information is 
processed in a more conceptual manner than inconsistent information.  
     Further evidence for the EFM provides a study by Ehrenberg and Klauer (2005). In 
a source monitoring task they presented their participants with the same amount of consistent, 
inconsistent and neutral information about two oppositely stereotyped target persons. The 
information given combined each behaviour description with a photo of one of both target 
persons. After this presentation participants were instructed to decide whether one particular 
behaviour description had previously been shown to them or not. If they decided that the 
target item was “old”, participants then had to match the behaviour description to one of both 
target persons. Ehrenberg and Klauer (2005) observed a profound memory advantage for the 
target person when it was presented together with inconsistent information as compared to 
presentation with consistent information under cognitive load. Their results somewhat 
contradict the findings by Macrae and colleagues concerning individuation under load 
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(Macrae et al., 1999). Macrae and colleagues explained their finding for better memory for the 
source of a trait as indication for a resource consuming individuation process that will be 
depleted under conditions of scarce cognitive resources. It is noteworthy, traits have been 
shown as facilitating memory for consistent information (Stangor & McMillan, 1992).   
Additionally, Ehrenberg and Klauer documented a substantial memory for the source 
of stereotype-inconsistent information, particularly after a 30 minutes retention interval, 
suggesting an encoding of contextual details into episodic long term memory. Despite the role 
a perceptual or contextual detail might play, the photo of a target person is possibly 
conceptually “contaminated”. That means that a photo is not purely perceptual information 
but rather functions as reference for the consistent and inconsistent information and might 
therefore become important in the expectancy-based recollection processes. Therefore it is 
worthwhile to develop an extension of the behavioural descriptions used by Ehrenberg and 
Klauer to include irrelevant information such as letter colour or screen position of the 
behavioural description as source information.  
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3 Procedural components of stereotyping 
 
3.1 Individuation and inconsistency resolution 
 
The advantage for inconsistent information in memory is often described as a 
consequence of deeper processing (Srull & Wyer, 1989; Craik & Lockhart, 1972; Hastie, 
1981; Hastie & Kumar, 1979) which is very resource-consuming (Hastie, 1981; Brewer, 
1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990) and therefore depleted under conditions of cognitive load 
(Hilton & von Hippel, 1996; Macrae et al., 1999). This “deeper processing” is either 
understood as inconsistency resolution, where perceivers try to explain and meld the 
inconsistent information with their stereotypic anticipation (Sherman & Hamilton, 1994; 
Hastie, 1981; Hilton & von Hippel, 1996; Hutter & Crisp, 2005; Macrae et al., 1999; Srull & 
Wyer, 1989), or as the individual organization of perceived impressions directly linked to the 
target person, called individuation (Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Macrae et al., 
1999).  
This has noteworthy implications about the potential of deeper processing to change a 
stereotype. If inconsistency resolution and individuation processes taking place in an 
impression formation act, the whole impression of the particular person might change during 
the perception and processing of the behaviour descriptions (or, in the real world, of some sort 
of behaviour). In case the impression of an individual changes, the stereotypical anticipation 
of forthcoming behaviour should also change. Consequently, processing of incoming 
information becomes less guided by preceding stereotypes or prior knowledge of 
stereotypically consistent behaviour and therefore the inconsistency advantage/consistency 
disadvantage in memory should disappear (Kunda et al., 2002; Kunda, Davies, Hoshino-
Browne, & Jordan, 2003).   
Traditionally, it is argued that with weak or absent individuating information 
stereotyping (expectancy) is strong and with an increasing amount of individuating 
information available the stereotyping is reduced (see Brewer, 1996; for a discussion). It is 
assumed furthermore, that if individuating information achieves a particular magnitude the 
process of stereotyping accelerates anew, because through the increasing amount of 
information cognitive capacity is reduced and category based impressions are preferred again.  
The processes of inconsistency resolution and individuation concerning a single 
person during an extended impression formation process, could then lead to weaker 
stereotypical expectancies regarding the expected behaviour of a target person. These 
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considerations give rise to the assumption that the individuation and inconsistency resolution 
processes are impaired by additional cognitive load, which is not necessarily information- 
magnitude-dependent.  
 
3.2 Tests and extensions 
 
Macrae et al. (1999) predicted and found an impaired inconsistency resolution by a 
concurrent strategic-executive-task. Recollection memory for inconsistent information was 
diminished under conditions of cognitive load. That the process of individuation was 
diminished by the executive demand was condensed in lower source memory (memory for the 
particular target person) for inconsistent information. The usage of the term “individuation” 
here and elsewhere requires some extra attention: Individuation is usually understood as the 
change of an impression through increased accumulation of information pieces concerning a 
person. However the investigation of individuation procedures by Macrae and colleagues 
elaborates on better memory for one person or another using only a single measure of 
competing memory quality. This is more of a differentiation ability measure than an 
assessment of individual impression formation changes. Nonetheless, the ability to 
differentiate between variable pieces of information concerning two targets previously 
categorised depends on cognitive load, subsequently indicating that category-based 
perceptions are enhanced by scarce cognitive resources.   
Following the approach by Macrae et al. (1999) source memory for consistent 
information in a person perception process, should initially be greater than source memory for 
inconsistent information under load. The increasing amount of information about an 
individual target person should affect memory capacity and processing of both consistent and 
inconsistent information within an ongoing impression formation process. Because of the 
category based impression formation especially memory for consistent information is 
expected to improve and the difference between consistent and inconsistent information 
should become more pronounced. The process described can be called “vertical” 
individuation that focuses on single pieces of information. This kind of single-piece-of-
information-individuation is understood by Macrae et al. as hampered by cognitive load.  
An additional concern has to be included by the depth-of-processing-model (Hastie & 
Kumar, 1979) that binds the necessity of deeper processing on the novelty value of perceived 
information. The novelty value itself is influenced by serial position of the item, the number 
of similar previous behaviours, and the degree of incongruence with the current trait 
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impression. Hastie and Kumar presented their participants with different proportions of 
inconsistent items at different positions in the presentation process and found a characteristic 
pattern of serial position curves for the recall of inconsistent information compared to 
consistent information. A proportion of 1-3 inconsistent in a total presentation of 14 items (all 
others being consistent) were substantially better remembered than consistent information, a 
proportion of 5-7 incongruent of 14 items led to a diminishing memory for inconsistent 
information over the presentation phase.  
It can be hypothesized that with an increasing amount of individuating information the 
higher novelty value advantage for inconsistent information is reduced during the impression 
formation process. At the end of the process a decreasing memory also for perceptual/ 
contextual details of inconsistent information remains. Hastie and Kumar found overlapping 
courses of the memory graphs for consistent and inconsistent information at the end of the 
impression formation process.  
 
3.3 Stereotyping as continuously adapted permanent anticipation 
 
Stereotyping is by definition a process. The assumption that a primed stereotype is 
dissipating with time and space between information pieces is widely acknowledged and 
recognized in spreading-activation and depth-of-processing-models (Anderson, 1983; 
McClelland & Rumelhart, 1986; Hastie & Kumar, 1979; Craik & Lockhart, 1972). Even 
though the definition of stereotyping as a process is undisputedly accepted, its investigation as 
a process coverings a certain time span is widely neglected and is to date - with remarkable 
exceptions - practically non-existent (for a critical review see: Kunda et al., 2002; Kunda et 
al., 2003). 
Typically, experiments in person perception with cognitive load manipulations use a 
design that presents the same amount of stereotype-consistent and inconsistent items to the 
participants, asking them to form impressions of the target persons. During the procedure they 
are exposed to cognitive load and subsequently asked to remember the behaviour 
descriptions, traits or sources of the presented behaviours. Usually, the data is analyzed en 
bloc, i.e. the encoding procedure and memory for a stereotype-inconsistent item in the 
beginning of the impression formation process were the same as for an item in the end of the 
encoding process.  
But stereotyping – including the sub-processes of stereotype activation and application 
– are better be described in terms of a process of continuously adapted permanent 
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anticipation. Effects of a different encoding of stereotype- or expectancy(!) consistent and 
inconsistent information, such as mentioned above (Hastie & Kumar, 1979; Rojahn & 
Pettigrew, 1992; Stangor & McMillan, 1992) show that information intake is always preceded 
by a certain expectation. The fit of incoming information and the categorical expectation 
influence the use of further application of more or less accessible stereotypical schemas 
(Nolan et al., 1999; Klauer & Wegener, 1998). In addition, stereotyping can be understood as 
continuous adaptation to the ever changing social reality of perceivers, who are motivated to 
construct a coherent picture of their social surroundings (Spears & Haslam, 1997). One of the 
social/psychological theories describing the continuous adaptation of the 
categorization/stereotyping process in progress is the continuum model developed by Fiske 
and Neuberg (1990; see Figure 1). This model describes the recategorisation processes if the 
available information does not fit the applied stereotypical expectations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The continuum model of impression formation according to Fiske and Neuberg (1990) 
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Findings in favour of an adjustable categorization as a consequence of disconfirming 
exemplars or behaviour were provided by Kunda (1995), Macrae (1999) and in numerous 
findings of effects of subtyping due to confrontation with ill-fitting exemplars. Subtyping – 
reassigning exemplars to sub-categories – is described as an effortful causal reasoning process 
(Kunda & Oleson, 1995) and as depleted under conditions of cognitive load (Yzerbyt, Coull, 
& Rocher, 1999). Moreover, the effort in subtyping, depleted by cognitive load, is moderated 
by social identity enhancement motivations (Coull, Yzerbyt, Castano, Paladino, & Leemans, 
2001). The causal reasoning process as a consequence of the combination of social concepts, 
that appear to be mutually exclusive, is described as leading to “emergent attributes” (Kunda, 
Miller, & Claire, 1990; Hastie, Schroeder, & Weber, 1990). Hastie and colleagues explained 
their results emerging attributes in terms of a “selective modification model” developed by 
Smith, Osherson, Rips, & Keane (1988). This model assumes a frame structure in long term 
memory where social categories are represented with slots corresponding to typical 
characteristics of members of the particular group and allowing some kind of softly 
constrained variability. At some point in the perception process the discrepancy between the 
available information and the activated frame in long term memory is presumably so strong 
that the frame application is modified or disrupted. In a second stage, a complex explanation 
for the discrepant attributes is sought by causal reasoning. Here, memory search is a 
frequently described solution (Kunda et al., 1990; Hutter & Crisp, 2008). Furthermore, load 
effects on the production of emergent attributes as inconsistency resolution are reported 
(Hutter & Crisp, 2006). However, another crucial process may be employed under conditions 
of cognitive load:   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Model of a schema based person perception process as continuously adapted anticipation with a 
conceptual subframe (psychological) and a superior perceptual frame (physical context or memory). 
   
The third component of a stereotyping process, which requires attention, is the context 
reference of the interrupted stereotyping. Recently, Deutsch and Fazio (2008) presented 
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findings of perceivers shifting their attention towards features that facilitate the discrimination 
between stereotype confirming and disconfirming exemplars. Förster and colleagues (Förster, 
Higgins, & Strack, 2000; Förster, Higgins, & Werth, 2004) observed better memory for 
irrelevant details (background colour) of inconsistent information. Kunda and Oleson (1995) 
discovered, that stereotypes were less likely to be changed when participants had the 
opportunity not to generalize but to subtype deviant exemplars by the use of irrelevant 
attributes. Of particular importance in this field of research are the findings by Sherman and 
colleagues (Sherman et al., 2004; Sherman et al., 1998) who discovered enhanced memory for 
perceptual details of inconsistent information under cognitive load conditions (please refer to 
paragraph 2.4). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Model of a schema based person perception process as continuously adapted anticipation with a 
conceptual subframe (psychological) and a superior perceptual frame (physical context or memory) in a 
adaptation shift as a consequence of the processing of inconsistent information  
 
In sum, it is plausible to specify stereotyping as a continuously adapted, permanent 
anticipation with substantial reference to a given context (present in memory or in the current 
surroundings, see Figure 2). Stereotyping as adapted anticipation particularly occurs when 
expectancy disconfirming information is perceived. Presumably it is driven by an attempt to 
resolve inconsistencies, i.e. to find reasons for them and hints enabling the perceiver to 
discriminate relevant information (see Figure 3). Finally, the ultimate goal of this process of 
continuous adaptation of the ongoing anticipation process is the optimal adjustment to the 
world.  
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3.4 Conclusion 
   
In the beginning of this chapter two contrasting views on stereotyping, yet still 
unresolved in research, were discussed. The first assumes, that a stereotype is a flexible 
resource-saving tool, whose use can be impaired by cognitive load, while the second claims, 
that stereotyping is a necessary prerequisite of human information processing largely 
unaffected by additional processing demands.  
The efficiency-expert and meaning-seeker-assumptions allow for different 
interpretations. Better encoding of inconsistent information is understood in the broad view of 
a cognitive-miser/ efficiency-expert as a consequence of a resource-consuming inconsistency 
resolution or individuation process (Macrae et al., 1999). Following their argument, cognitive 
load must lead to worse memory for inconsistent information – and even more so for the 
sources and contextual details of inconsistent information.  
In the frame of their depth- of-processing-model, Hastie and Kumar (1979) explained 
the results of their experiments as consequence of the informational value of items, which is 
based on the serial position of the item, the number of similar previous behaviours, and the 
degree of incongruence with the current trait impression. Hastie and Kumar further describe 
the deeper processing of inconsistent items as a resource-consuming inconsistency resolution 
and impression change (individuation) process. With reference to Hastie and Kumar, memory 
should initially be weaker for inconsistent information than for consistent information under 
cognitive load. Beyond the initial impression, memory advantages are lost together with the 
informational value of an item. In consequence, the difference between consistent and 
inconsistent information is expected to rise under cognitive load. 
Sherman and colleagues (Sherman et al., 1998; Sherman et al., 2000) argue that 
stereotypes may be used flexibly at encoding of stereotype-consistent and inconsistent 
information under cognitive load. Stereotype-consistent information is deeper encoded on a 
conceptual level whereas inconsistent information is encoded less conceptually but more 
perceptually for later inspection and integration. The EFM (Sherman et al., 1998; 2004) 
explains the inconsistency advantage in recognition memory as a consequence of an 
automatic attention reallocation process based on substantial vigilance mechanisms. Under 
conditions of scarce cognitive resources, the EFM predicts a shift of processing of perceptual 
details away from consistent information and towards inconsistent information. 
The EFM does not specifically elaborate on the process of continuous person 
perception, but by interpreting the EFM it is assumed here that the better recognition memory 
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for sources or irrelevant details of stereotype-inconsistent compared to consistent information 
under cognitive load is not referable to an individuation or inconsistency resolution processes 
in favour of inconsistent information but to the impairment of encoding of 
perceptual/contextual details of consistent information because of available heuristic 
processing strategies such as spontaneous trait inferences (Wigboldus et al., 2003; 2004).  
Relying on the explanations provided by the EFM together with theories concerning 
stereotyping as a process it can be assumed that the source memory is better for inconsistent 
information in the initial part of the impression formation process. But with the growth of 
individuating information the initial stereotype label loses its referential value and heuristic 
processes are replaced by detailed processing facilitating increased source memory also for 
consistent information.  
On the other hand it is plausible to understand stereotyping as a necessary strategic 
meaning-seeking-process, which does not have to be impaired by cognitive load (Nolan et al., 
1999; Spears & Haslam, 1997). And even more so, person perception must be understood as 
an adaptive process of permanent categorisation and stereotyping. Within this dissertation 
inconsistency resolution and individuation are understood as inevitable adaptation processes, 
which remain unimpressed by cognitive load and which may lead to the dissipation of the 
reference stereotype itself (Kunda et al., 2003; Kunda et al., 2002). Stereotype-inconsistent 
information is not avoided under cognitive load but equally considered or even preferred for 
building an adequate mental representation. Because of the apparent inconsistencies this leads 
to a reasoning- or contextual cue-guided recategorisation. Consequentially, memory for 
inconsistent information is by no means worse than memory for consistent information and 
initially, the contextual cues are especially noticed for inconsistent information. But this 
difference for contextual memory for inconsistent and consistent information advantage 
diminishes with the decreasing fit of stereotypical social category and concrete behaviour.  
The EFM and the meaning-seeker-hypothesis are to this point comparable in their 
predictions but they differ on another crucial point, namely automaticity. According to the 
EFM stronger perceptual encoding under cognitive load is a consequence of an inevitably 
automatic attention reallocation process. Consequently, better memory for perceptual details 
makes them accessible for later inspection. The meaning-seeker-assumption suggests that the 
concentration on perceptual details illustrates the attempt to enable a meaningful 
recategorisation and that the attention focus towards perceptual details is no longer traceable 
if the perceivers are informed of an arbitrary character of the context information.  
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4 The role of encoding flexibility in search for meaning 
 
4.1 Main Hypotheses 
 
4.1.1 Hypothesis concerning the memory for perceptual details of inconsistent 
information 
 
It is predicted that with less cognitive capacity (more cognitive load) the memory for 
irrelevant perceptual details of stereotype-inconsistent information is enhanced in comparison 
to the memory for perceptual details of stereotype-consistent information. 
 
4.1.2 Hypothesis concerning the diminishing of the inconsistency effect 
 
It is predicted that with an increased amount of stereotype-consistent and inconsistent 
information the initial memory advantage for perceptual details of inconsistent information 
under cognitive load will disappear during the impression formation process.  
 
4.1.3 Hypothesis concerning the automaticity of the attention allocation process. 
 
It is predicted that the initial attention directed at contextual details of inconsistent 
information is omitted, if the context information is described as arbitrary and unconnected to 
the target person and the behaviour descriptions  
 
 
4.2 Overview of the experiments 
 
In the 1st experiment the participants were presented with stereotype-consistent and 
stereotype-inconsistent behaviour descriptions about two female target persons, a prostitute 
and a physician. Based on the preliminary findings by Sherman and colleagues (1998; 2004), 
Ehrenberg and Klauer (2005), and the theoretical assumptions of the EFM, I expected to find 
a better source memory for stereotype-inconsistent behaviour of the target person, if 
participants were placed under cognitive load. According to the recategorisation assumptions 
(Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Kunda et al., 2002; Kunda et al., 2003) it was also expected, to find 
a significant decline of advantages for stereotype-inconsistent source memory over the 
presentation phase.  
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In the 2nd Experiment only behaviour descriptions about one of the target persons were 
presented on either the left or right side of a screen in order to investigate the encoding 
sensitivity for semantically unrelated contextual details of stereotype-inconsistent and 
consistent information. According to the predictions of the EFM (Sherman et al., 1998), I 
expected better memory for the screen position of inconsistent behaviour descriptions if they 
were. The results of the experiment were expected to reaffirm the reduction of memory 
advantages for contextual details of inconsistent information over the presentation phase 
already observed in the 1st experiment. 
In the 3rd experiment participants were presented with both target persons, according 
to the experimental paradigm by Ehrenberg and Klauer (2005), and with the behaviour 
descriptions at both screen positions as in Experiment 2. After the presentation they were 
asked for the target person and the screen position to test the assumption of an individuation 
effect such as assumed by Macrae et al. (1999) vs. the automatic attention reallocation 
hypothesis as developed by Sherman et al. (1998). And once more the experiment was 
supposed to show the diminishing of the inconsistency effect.  
In the 4th experiment participants were expected to show an automatic attention 
reallocation reaction, even if directly informed of the upcoming way of presentation on 
different screen positions and the arbitrary character of the behaviour descriptions. They are 
expected to show a basic attention reallocation reaction anyway, if the encoding of stereotype-
inconsistent information under cognitive load is a non-strategic, perceptual (Sherman et al., 
1998) and unintentional process that occurs without perceivers' awareness (Macrae, Milne, & 
Bodenhausen, 1994). Using the same experimental paradigm as in Experiment 2 participants 
were informed about the course of the experiment, i.e. they were told that behaviour 
descriptions would be shown at different screen positions and that this required to focus their 
attention. In a second condition we informed participants of the fact that the kind of the 
behaviour description (positive and negative) was unrelated to its screen position. 
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5 Experiments 
 
5.1 Multinomial Models 
 
To investigate the inconsistency advantage for irrelevant context information under 
conditions of scarce cognitive resources compared to sufficient resources employed a source-
monitoring multinomial model analysis (Batchelder & Riefer, 1990, 1999; Erdfelder & 
Bredenkamp, 1998; Meiser & Bröder, 2002), which allows the separate assessment of item, 
source and context memory as well as guessing strategies. 
Usually, most studies concerning memory for consistent and inconsistent information 
are focused on the assessment of item information. But the EFM (Sherman et al., 1998; 
Sherman et al., 2004) with the assumption of better memory for episodic details of an 
inconsistent information impression formation and individuation assumption by Macrae et al. 
(1999) encourage the consideration of methods for the investigation of source monitoring.  
In a paradigmatic source discrimination experiment the participants are presented with 
a certain amount of mixed items from two lists A and B. After the initial presentation the lists 
are mixed again and presented with new items added. The participants now have to decide if 
the item has been presented before or if it is new. If the participants decided that the item was 
old, i.e. previously presented, they are asked if the old item originates from list A or list B. If 
they initially decided that the item was new, no decision had to be made for the sources of the 
items (list A or B) and another item for the old/new-decision was directly presented 
afterwards. Potential classification options are presented in Table 1.  
 
 
      Attribution    
Source  A  B  N 
A  AA  BA  AN 
B  AB  BB  BN 
NEW  NA  NB  NN 
 
Table 1. Potential classifications in the source discrimination task 
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                      Figure 4. Multinomial model of source discrimination 
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A previously presented item from list A can be incorrectly judged as new (AN) or as 
old from list B (AB) or correctly as an old item from list A (AA). The underlying cognitive 
processes for the binary old/new-decision and the source discrimination can be mere guessing 
or recognition. Based on the fact that perfect memory for larger information amounts is rare, 
the use of stereotype-based guessing strategies is very likely. The decision hierarchy can be 
presented in a processing tree of probabilities starting from the origin of the item on the A-, B-
, or New-list along the correct detection, the correct guessing, and the wrong guessing of old 
and new items to the correct detection, the correct guessing and the wrong guessing of the 
origin of the item (see Figure 4.). 
 In the multinomial model item memory is reflected in the ability of the participants to 
distinguish between a previously presented item and a distractor item documented in the 
correct decision between old or new when a probe item is presented. Participants are able to 
do that with a certain probability reflected in the model parameter D. The probability that the 
probe item is not remembered is reflected in the directly opposed probability parameter 1-D. 
The detection of distractor items is labelled by model parameter DN and it reflects the 
probability of the correct decision for new when the distractor item is presented. The opposing 
probability 1-DN indicates that the distractor item is not identified. 
“Source memory” is the memory for the source or the context of the target item 
provided that the target item itself has been recognized (correctly or not) as old. In 
multinomial models of source monitoring it can be denoted with the probability d and it 
reflects the detectability of the person the target item was presented about (Ehrenberg & 
Klauer, 2005) or perceptual details of the target information, such as height and position 
(Meiser, 2005), or letter colour (Smith & Bayen, 2004). The opposite parameter 1-d stands for 
the probability of not detecting the source or details of the item.  
Recollection processes can be biased by stereotypical expectations (Macrae, 
Schloerscheidt, Bodenhausen, & Milne, 2002), familiarity with the items or cognitive load 
(Ehrenberg & Klauer, 2005). Guessing of an item is reflected by the parameter b. If an item or 
a distractor were not remembered, the item or the distractor can be guessed as old or new. If 
an item was not remembered or a distractor not detected, the probability b indicates guessing 
an item or a distractor as old whereas the opposite probability 1-b indicates the classification 
of an item as distractor or as new.  
The source or the context of a target item can also be guessed and this is captured by 
the model parameter a. It reflects the decision for one of the alternatives presented with the 
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target item instead of the original source or context. The probability 1-a indicates the decision 
for the other source or context.  
The processing trees for both basic sources have the same fundamental structure. 
Different indices DA or DB denote the different original sources. The single parameter values 
can be estimated with a maximum likelihood method on the basis of empirical answer 
frequencies in different answer categories by multiplication of the parameters of a tree branch 
and the addition of the branch products leading to answer categories (for an introduction see 
Batchelder & Riefer, 1990; Meiser & Bröder, 2002). The formula [DA × dA] + [DA × (1-dA) × 
a] + [(1-DA) × b × a] represents the answer category AA. A good fit of the whole model is 
assumed if the χ²-distributed goodness-of-fit-index G² is not significantly different from zero. 
Basically, this kind of multinomial model will be used for Experiments 1, 2 and 3.   
If more than one source dimensions is employed (e.g. memory for size and location of 
items, or the source and the background of the information) the multinomial source 
monitoring model for crossed source information (Meiser & Bröder, 2002) is the appropriate 
assessment tool. Additional parameters for the memory for the second source dimension are 
inserted there. The probability parameter e reflects the memory for the source for the second 
dimension provided that the source in the first dimension was not remembered. The parameter 
g stands for guessing the source of the first and second dimension for unrecognized target 
items. The multinomial source monitoring model for crossed source dimensions allows the 
assessment of item source, and context memory for consistent and inconsistent items under 
conditions of load and no load. It also provides an opportunity to compare the memory quality 
in different presentation phases. It will be described in further detail in the third experiment. 
 
5.2 Experiment 1 
 
5.2.1 Introduction 
 
It is widely assumed that advantages in memory for inconsistent information are 
characterized by deeper processing and events of inconsistency resolution and individuation 
particularly under conditions of sufficient cognitive resources (Norman & Bobrow, 1975; 
Hastie & Kumar, 1979; Craik & Lockhart, 1972; Hastie, 1981; Srull & Wyer, 1989), and that 
these "depth of processing"-attempts will be impaired by concurrent executive tasks (Hilton & 
von Hippel, 1996; Macrae et al., 1999). On the other hand there are findings of substantially 
better memory for details of inconsistent information even under conditions of cognitive load 
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(Sherman et al., 1998; Sherman et al., 2004) and a better source memory even under 
conditions of scarce cognitive resources (Ehrenberg & Klauer, 2005).  
Macrae and colleagues (1999) predicted and found an impaired inconsistency 
resolution by a concurrent strategic-executive task. Recollection memory for inconsistent 
information was diminished under conditions of cognitive load. That the process of 
individuation was diminished by the executive demand becomes apparent in lower source 
memory for inconsistent information.  
 
Following the approach by Macrae and colleagues, source memory for consistent 
information should be better than source memory for inconsistent information under load. 
And with an increasing amount of information about the individual target person the 
individuation process should be consistently impaired by cognitive load and the consistency 
advantage for source information should remain unchanged.  
 
Another important point is made by the depth of processing model (Hastie, & Kumar, 
1979), which binds the necessity of deeper processing in inconsistency resolutions to the 
novelty value of the perceived information. The novelty value itself is influenced by serial 
position of the item, the number of similar previous behaviours and the degree of 
incongruence with the current trait impression. It can be hypothesized that with an increasing 
amount of individuating information the higher novelty value advantage for inconsistent 
information is reduced during the impression formation process. This may result in a 
decreasing memory also for sources and perceptual/contextual details of inconsistent 
information. But following Hastie and Kumar the memory for inconsistent information is 
influenced by cognitive load. The inconsistency resolution, seen as responsible for the 
inconsistency advantage, is depleted by cognitive load, so that there should be no memory 
advantage for inconsistent information under load. Hastie and Kumar did not include memory 
for sources or contextual details in consideration but:  
 
With Hastie and Kumar, inconsistency resolution and individuation should – as 
resource consuming processes – are impaired by load that also affects source memory and 
contextual details. 
 
The encoding flexibility model (Sherman et al., 1998, 2004) explains the inconsistency 
advantage in recognition memory not as a consequence of deeper processing within 
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inconsistency resolution but as a result of a more superficial, automatic attention reallocation 
process based on substantial vigilance mechanisms. Under conditions of scarce cognitive 
resources the EFM predicts an attention shift from processing of perceptual details of 
consistent information towards details of parallel presented inconsistent information. By 
contrast, Ehrenberg and Klauer (2005) found better memory not only for inconsistent 
information presented alone (one item at a time compared to parallel presentation with 
consistent items) but also for the personal source of inconsistent information, which may be 
semantically more meaningful than mere perceptual details and is susceptible to individuation 
processes, which are usually assumed to be depleted by cognitive load – which was certainly 
not the case in the study by Ehrenberg and Klauer. 
In the theoretical context of the assumptions of a more adaptation seeking processing, 
and which contrasts with the effort-preventing-assumptions, it can be assumed that cognitive 
load has no effect on the encoding for as long as the information fits a specifically primed 
category. If the fit is reduced during the impression formation the categorical memory 
advantages should decrease.  
 
Together with the EFM and the meaning-seeker-assumption and contrary to the usual 
inconsistency-resolution-depth-of-processing-assumptions it is hypothesized that source 
memory is better for inconsistent information in the initial part of the impression formation 
process. Additionally, within the framework of the procedural models it is assumed that with 
the growth of individuating information the initial stereotype label will – regardless of  
cognitive load – lose its referential value because of reduced fit with the social category of the 
target person. Finally, the differences between source memory for consistent and inconsistent 
information should decrease.  
 
Combined with Experiment 1 is an initial test of the stimulus material which is based 
on an extended replication of the study by Ehrenberg and Klauer (2005). They found a better 
memory for the target person if the presented behaviour was inconsistent. This effect was 
revealed under conditions of cognitive load and a prolonged retention interval.  
Experiment 1 used the basic conditions of the study by Ehrenberg and Klauer. Our 
participants were presented with the same amount of stereotype-consistent, inconsistent and 
neutral behaviour descriptions and asked to classify the items as old or new and then to assign 
the old items to one of both target persons. 
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In contrast to Ehrenberg and Klauer Experiment 1 manipulated cognitive load with a 
vigilance task that is expected to impair perceptual attention towards perceptual details of the 
target information. The employed multinomial model analysis of the data allows the separate 
analysis of memory and guessing tendencies.  
In accordance with Ehrenberg & Klauer (2005) the results of this experiment were 
expected to document better memory of the target person for stereotype-inconsistent 
behaviour descriptions and, additionally, a decrease of the initial memory advantage. 
 
5.2.2 Method 
 
The 1st experiment has a 2 (concurrent task: load vs. no load) x 2 (source: physician 
vs. prostitute) x 3 (target valence: positive, negative, neutral) x 3 (presentation phase: first 16 
items, second 16 items, third 16 items) mixed design with repeated measures on the last three 
factors. 
Participants 64 students at the Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena/ Germany were 
given 7 € for their participation in the Experiment 1. The experiments were run in sessions 
with a maximum of five participants. Participants were randomly assigned to the load/no load 
condition so that 33 participants were in the no load condition and 31 participants were in the 
load condition. 
Materials Two female target persons of approximately the same age were introduced 
as a prostitute and a physician, named Andrea or Claudia and living in Dresden. The 
prostitute was described as double-faced, arrogant, and uninterested in her social surrounding. 
The physician was described as open-minded, kind and interested in her social surroundings. 
Both target persons were represented by a portrait photo according to their described character 
showing a kind woman and arrogant looking woman.  
Ninety-six items were taken from a pre-test by Ehrenberg, Cataldegirmen, & Klauer 
(2000) such that the selected items fitted the targets’ gender and were in accordance to the 
stereotype valence (positive, negative, neutral). An inconsistent item resulted for instance in a 
combination of positive source and negative target-item combination, a consistent item in a 
negative source and negative target-item combination. Neutral items were neutral for both 
sources.  
The participants were presented with 48 items in the presentation phase and 48 target 
items and 48 distractors in the test phase. Item order and item valence/target person 
combination were randomized so that a positive item served as a consistent item for the 
physician and the same time (for another participant) as an inconsistent item for the prostitute 
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and vice versa. Essentially, item valence target person combinations were randomized across 
participants. 
Twenty-four items were presented about each target person: eight positive, eight 
negative and eight neutral behaviour descriptions. In the test phase the items were presented 
in a new order mixed with 48 distractor items, which were pulled from the same pool of items 
where the target items originated. 
Cognitive load was manipulated with a vigilance task. The participants were presented 
with a randomly emitted short Windows-system tone in intervals of 0.5 to 2 seconds. They 
were instructed to press the space bar at the computer keyboard whenever they heard the tone. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Presentation of the prostitute-target-person and the introduction 
 
The retention interval (30 minutes) was filled with the task to listen carefully to a radio 
broadcast about the social security system in Germany in order to be able to summarize and to 
its content afterwards. After the retention interval the participants were instructed to give a 
short summary of their impressions. The form field was restricted to 18 lines.  
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Procedure At their individual arrival participants were sat into single cubicles. The 
sessions started simultaneously and were run fully computerized. The participants were led to 
believe that the experiment is a study concerning young adults in East Germany conducted by 
scientists and journalists, and they were asked to read short descriptions of people from 
different social classes to form impressions about them and to answer some questions 
afterwards. After the introduction of the two target persons (see Figure 5 and 6), the 
participants were asked to form an impression of the targets. Each participant saw 8 positive, 
8 negative and 8 neutral behaviour descriptions about the physician and 8 positive, 8 negative 
and 8 neutral behaviour descriptions about the prostitute in random order for 6 seconds each.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Presentation of the physician-target-person with introduction 
 
 
In the next stage participants were asked to rate the target persons on several trait 
dimensions and tell their general sympathy for both professions. After the ratings the 
participants were instructed to estimate the amount of positive and negative items shown 
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about one of the target persons in the presentation phase. Finally, they were asked to answer 
some biographical questions and were thanked, paid, and later received a debriefing email. 
Data analysis The item amount of the whole presentation phase was split into three 
segments of 16 items each. This division is oriented towards the amount of consistent and 
inconsistent items used by Hastie & Kumar (1979). Consistent items at an early stage of 
presentation were directly compared with inconsistent items at the same stage. At the point of 
the 16th item the participants had seen on average 5 consistent and 5 inconsistent items (and 5 
neutral). In the study by Hastie and Kumar the inconsistency advantage is at this stage in all 
proportion-conditions irrefutably obvious. Macrae and colleagues (1999) also presented this 
amount of items about their particular target person.  
At the stage of the second phase the participants saw about 10 items of each 
consistency value comparable to the relative amount of items used by Sherman and 
colleagues (1998, 2000). The third stage (16 items for each consistency value) is oriented on 
the study by Ehrenberg & Klauer (2005) and on the average amount of items used in studies 
concerning the memory for consistent and inconsistent information as can be seen from the 
meta-analysis by Stangor & McMillan (1992).  
The previously described multinomial model was employed, with the following 
parameters for data analysis: D for item memory; b for item guessing; d for source memory; 
and a for source guessing. The parameters for the detection of new items were set equal with 
the corresponding item detection parameter. This resulted in a saturated model, and this was 
adapted according to the hypotheses. The source guessing parameters a for consistent and 
inconsistent items were set equal, which was unproblematic because they were estimated with 
the same value.  
 Hypothetically it was assumed that there is no difference between consistent and 
inconsistent item detection parameters and only a general load effect. It was also predicted 
that there is no difference between the consistent and inconsistent source detection parameters 
without cognitive load, whereas under cognitive load an inconsistency advantage was 
expected. Moreover, the inconsistency advantage for source memory was suspected to 
decrease over the presentation phase.  
The following parameter restrictions of the multinomial model for all phases (x 
denotes cognitive load; y denotes valence; z denotes consistency) were tested by setting the 
parameters equal:  
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a) D load | y | z | = D no load | y | z | 
b) D x | y | consistent = D x | y | inconsistent  
c) D x | negative | consistent = D x | negative | inconsistent = D x | positive | consistent = D x | positive | 
inconsistent  
d) d load | y  | consistent = d load | y | inconsistent  
e) d no load | y  | consistent = d no load | y | inconsistent 
f) d load | negative | consistent = d load | negative | inconsistent = d load | positive | consistent = d load | positive 
|inconsistent  
 
Moreover we tested source memory in phase one against source memory in phase 
three:  d phase 1 | y | z   =   d phase 3 | y | z 
 
5.2.3 Results and discussion 
 
Item Memory The hypothesis of equal parameters for item memory under cognitive 
load (a) had to be rejected for the full data (Δχ²(4) =26,22, p<.05), phase one  (Δχ²(4) =26,84, 
p<.05) and two (Δχ²(4) =7,34, p<.05) as can be observed in Table 2. In phase three the 
parameters increasingly approximated equality.  
 
  General   Phase one    Phase two   Phase three   
  Δχ² df Δχ² df Δχ² df Δχ² df 
a 26,22* 4 26,84* 4 7,34* 4 3,82 4 
b 10,99* 4 23,30* 4 1,59 4 1,68 4 
c 11,21 6 23,96* 6 2,08 6 3,09 6 
d 12,99* 2 9,28* 2 14,49* 2 5,83 2 
e 7,29* 2 4,65 2 6,77* 2 1,92 2 
f 13,55* 3 9,44* 3 18,39* 3 18,49* 3 
Note. * p< .05 
 
Table 2. Values of Δχ² for sub-models of the multinomial memory model for Experiment 1. 
 
This indicates an effectiveness of the load manipulation in general and specifically for 
the first two phases. It also indicates a diminishing cognitive load effect – at least for this kind 
of load manipulation.  
 
38 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Item and source memory in Experiment 1 (full data) as a function of cognitive load, valence 
and consistency between target person and item information 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Item and source memory in Experiment 1 (phase 1) as a function of cognitive load, valence 
and consistency between target person and item information 
 
The hypothesis of the equal memory for consistent and inconsistent information in 
general (b), independent of the load manipulation, also had to be rejected for the complete 
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data (Δχ²(4) =10,99, p<.05, see Figure 7) and for phase one (Δχ²(4) =23,30, p<.05, see Figure 
8) but not for phase two (Figure 9) and three (Figure 10). Obviously, there is a general 
memory advantage for inconsistent item information – irrespective of any load manipulation. 
This result stands in opposition to earlier findings and hypotheses of memory for 
inconsistent item information and inconsistency resolution but is in line with meaning-seeker-
assumptions. By setting the valence parameters equal (c) the difference between the consistent 
and inconsistent item detection parameters disappeared for the whole data but not for phase 
one (Δχ²(4) =23,96, p<.05). This can be traced back to a significant difference between 
positive consistent and positive inconsistent item detection parameters in phase one. In sum, 
the hypothesis of differences only for load and no load in parameters for item detection found 
by Ehrenberg and Klauer (2005) finds small support from our data. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Item and source memory in Experiment 1(phase 2) as a function of cognitive load, valence 
and consistency between target person and item information 
 
 
Source Memory The main interest here was a test for significant differences in 
memory for the sources of consistent and inconsistent information in the according parameter 
estimates. Setting the parameters for consistent and inconsistent source detection equal (d) 
resulted in significant differences for the full data (Figure 7) and phase one (Figure 8) and two 
(Figure 9) but not phase three (Δχ²(4) = 5,83, p=.05, see Figure 10). This could also be 
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attributed to a diminishing cognitive load manipulation. Although the inconsistency 
advantage for negative source information (negative information about the physician 
compared to negative information about the prostitute) is very strong and persistent over the 
presentation phase, whereas the memory for positive inconsistent information (positive 
information about the prostitute) increases strongly from phase 2 to phase 3, a test revealed 
that this reached significance only for the negative information condition. There was also a 
strong negativity effect detected, which was most obvious in phase two of the impression 
formation process. Here ceiling effect occurred indicating – together with very well memory 
in general – the limits of the cognitive load manipulation. 
All in all, the memory for information concerning the physician appears to be better 
remembered under load. Setting the valence and consistency parameters equal (f) resulted in 
strong and significant effects, which underlines the importance of valence in this paradigm. 
But the inconsistency advantage is not restricted to the load condition. Also a significant 
inconsistency advantage was found for the target person in the full data and the second phase 
but not the first and the third phase by setting the source detection parameters for “no load” 
equal (e).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Item and source memory in Experiment 1 (phase 3), as a function of cognitive load, valence and 
consistency between target person and item information 
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Phase differences The final hypothesis contained the assumption that the source 
memory advantage decreases over the full behaviour description period. There was 
concentration on the load manipulation, since the hypotheses are primarily focused on the 
load conditions, and compared only phase one and three with each other because memory for 
negative inconsistent information in phase two reached the edge of the parameter space.  
The assumption that setting of d-parameters equal results in significant changes could 
not be confirmed even though by looking at the parameters an improvement of inconsistent 
source memory for positive information seems obvious (see Fig. 11). However, post hoc a 
significant improvement of the item memory for positive consistent information appeared 
under load between phase 1 and phase 3 (Δχ²(1) =7,96, p<.05).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11.Source memory in Experiment 1, load condition, as a function of presentation phase, valence and 
consistency between target person and item information. 
 
5.2.4 Summary 
 
The first experiment mainly yielded the expected results, i.e. an inconsistency 
advantage for source information. However, this effect is not restricted to the load condition 
and strongly valence dependent. Furthermore, the expected load effect for item detection has 
been found but the decreasing of the inconsistency advantage could only be validated for item 
memory but unfortunately not significantly – as previously hypothesized – for source 
memory. Despite the fact that the load manipulation seemed to be effective, at least for item 
memory, there was no significant effect of load on the inconsistency advantage in source 
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memory. In the theoretical frameworks of the inconsistency-resolution-depth-of-processing-
models a load-independent inconsistency advantage for source and item memory is not very 
confirmative. However, also main assumptions of the EFM were not confirmed, namely that 
the shift of information processing capacity from consistent towards inconsistent information 
is a load dependent inconsistency memory advantage. The shift-of-attention-hypothesis is 
obviously not necessary. Neither is the assumption of better memory only for irrelevant 
context information, because memory was attested to be very good for item information as 
well as for semantically valuable source information.  
Unfortunately, the hypotheses concerning the diminishing inconsistency advantage for 
source information were not statistically confirmed – but unexpectedly we found a significant 
decrease of an consistency disadvantage in item memory in comparison of the 1st and the 3rd 
presentation phase, which is ascribable to an increase for positive consistent information over 
the presentation phases. 
One explanation for these mixed results could be an inappropriate load manipulation 
leading to an effective attention disruption. Even though there was a significant load effect on 
item memory in general the criteria for the discrimination of consistent and inconsistent 
information may not have been sufficiently implemented in the experimental design.  
If the load manipulation was insufficient the decreasing inconsistency advantage could 
also be explained by the inconsistency-resolution-assumptions and they fit the meaning- 
seeker-hypotheses with the assumption of less categorisation effects by the accommodation of 
the memory for consistent and inconsistent information what is here obviously an increase of 
memory for consistent information.  
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5.3 Experiment 2 
 
5.3.1 Introduction 
 
In Experiment 1 an inconsistency advantage for source information was observed, 
which can be interpreted as a result of an individuation process. On the other hand, the 
findings by Ehrenberg and Klauer (2005), interpreted according to the EFM (Sherman et al., 
1998; Sherman et al., 2004), suggest that the advantages in memory for source information 
are not a consequence of a strategic, semantically laborious individuation process but of an 
automatic attention reallocation process towards surface characteristics and 
perceptual/contextual details of inconsistent information.  
To test these contrary assumptions behaviour descriptions were presented on a left or 
right screen position in Experiment 2 to investigate the encoding sensitivity for semantically 
unrelated contextual details of inconsistent and consistent information. The sensitivity for 
screen position in source memory measures was used in various other contexts (e.g. Meiser, 
Sattler, & Weißer, 2008; Sherman et al., 2004). The load manipulation was implemented with 
a combination of a vigilance task and the acknowledged “eight-digit memory task”, which has 
been successfully employed in several other studies concerning memory for consistent and 
inconsistent information (Sherman et al., 1998; Gilbert & Hixon, 1991). The combined 
presentation of both additional tasks followed the assumption that with the organisation of 
two challenging tasks in two cognitive domains important for encoding – attention and 
memory – the executive functioning will be exceedingly impaired. The impairment of the 
executive functioning by demanding tasks is deemed to affect particularly the supposed 
inconsistency resolution and individuation attempts  (Macrae et al., 1999).  
Following the inconsistency resolution hypotheses (Macrae et al., 1999; Hastie & 
Kumar, 1979) there is a better memory for consistent item information under circumstances of 
cognitive load. According to main predictions of the EFM (Sherman et al., 1998), better 
memory for the screen position of the behaviour descriptions if they were inconsistent was 
also expected. Additionally, it was assumed that the advantages in memory for contextual 
details of inconsistent information will diminish over the presentation phase because of the 
desire for adequate perception and interpretation of the surroundings in the face of the weak 
fit of the presented information and the primed social category. If the inconsistency advantage 
is the consequence of an automatic attention reallocation process, as an effect inconsistent 
information generally induces, it may not be diminished during the impression formation 
process. With Hastie and Kumar (1979) an advantage induced by inconsistency resolution 
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will diminish during the impression formation because of the decreasing informational value 
of inconsistent information in association with the general amount of inconsistent 
information, its position during the presentation, and its general inconsistency degree. But this 
process is seen as impaired by cognitive load and according to Hastie and Kumar may not be 
very probable. 
If the inconsistency advantage is more than an automatic attention reallocation or an 
automatic inconsistency resolution, the attention and memory for contextual details may be 
very well in the initial part of the impression formation, because a necessary strategic process 
in the attempt to interpret the world and predict its inconsistencies correctly should be largely 
unaffected by concurrent tasks. The continuous loss of predictive value of task-irrelevant but 
systematically varying context information should result in a reduced difference in memory 
for contextual details of consistent and inconsistent information.  
In the sense of the EFM and the adaptation assumption an inconsistency advantage in 
memory for contextual details of inconsistent information is suggested which, in contrast to 
assumed implications of the EFM and the inconsistency resolution assumptions, is supposed 
to be a diminishing inconsistency advantage, independent of the present cognitive load.  
 
5.3.2 Method 
 
The 2nd Experiment had a 2 (concurrent task: load vs. no load) x 2 (source: physician 
vs. prostitute) x 2 (screen position: left vs. right) x3 (target valence: positive, negative, 
neutral) x 3 (presentation phase: first 16 items, second 16 items, third 16 items) mixed design 
with repeated measures on the last two factors.  
Participants 113 students at the Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena/ Germany were 
given 7 € for their participation in Experiment 2. The experiments were run in sessions of a 
maximum of five participants. Participants were randomly assigned to the cognitive load and 
the target employment condition, so that 27 participants were in the no load/prostitute 
condition; 27 in the no load/physician condition; 31 in the load/prostitute condition and 21 
participants were in the load/physician condition. The data of seven participants was excluded 
from analysis because of software errors.  
Material One of two pretested female target persons was introduced to each participant 
as a prostitute or as a physician, named Andrea or Claudia and living in Dresden. The 
prostitute was described as double-faced, arrogant, and uninterested in her social 
surroundings. The physician was described as open-minded, kind, and interested in the people 
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around her. Both target persons were represented according to their described character by a 
portrait photo showing a kind physician and arrogant-looking prostitute. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12. Example of the presentation of the physician-target-person with the behaviour description 
on the right screen position  
 
  
Ninety-six items were taken from a pre-test by Ehrenberg, Cataldegirmen, & Klauer 
(2000) such that the selected items fitted the targets’ gender and were in accordance to the 
stereotype valence (positive, negative, neutral). An inconsistent item resulted for instance in a 
positive source/negative target-item combination, a consistent item in a negative source/ 
negative target-item combination. Neutral items were neutral for both sources.  
The participants were presented with 48 items in the presentation phase and 48 target 
items and 48 distractors in the test phase. Item order and item valence/target person 
combination were randomized so that a positive item served as a consistent item for the 
physician and the same item served for different participants as an inconsistent item for the 
prostitute and vice versa, randomized across participants.  
All forty-eight items were presented about one target person, the prostitute or the 
physician, sixteen positive, sixteen negative and sixteen neutral behaviour descriptions. The 
items were presented one at a time on the left or on the right screen position, below the 
picture of the target person. The presentation on a certain screen position was completely 
randomized and there were no correlations between screen position and valence of the target 
item (see Figure 12 & 13). The photos of the target persons and the behaviour descriptions 
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were presented on the top centre of the screen in a 1024 x768 pixel screen resolution. Both, 
behaviour description and target photo were presented at the same time, with a duration of 6 
seconds. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13. Example of the presentation of the prostitute-target-person with the behaviour description 
on the left screen position 
 
 
Cognitive load was manipulated with a vigilance task. The participants were exposed 
to a randomly emitted, short Windows-system tone in intervals of 0.5 to 2 seconds. The 
participants were instructed to press the ”Y”-key on the computer keyboard whenever they 
heard the tone. To enhance the load pressure, participants were requested to keep an eight 
digit number in memory until when they were asked to recall it.  
The retention interval was filled with the task to listen carefully to a radio broadcast 
about the social security system in Germany to achieve the ability to tell subsequently what 
had been heard. After the retention interval the participants were instructed to give a short 
summary of their impressions.  
In the memory testing phase the behaviour descriptions and the distractors were 
presented in the middle of the screen below the photo of the target person. Below the 
behaviour descriptions old and new-buttons were presented (see Figure 14). Now the 
participants had to classify the presented information as old or new with the help of 
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corresponding buttons in the bottom line of the screen. After the behaviour description was 
classified as old it then appeared again on both (left and right side) of the screen.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14. Example of the presentation of the physician-target-person with the behaviour description 
for the old/new decision task 
 
 
Procedure Upon their individual arrival, participants were sat into single cubicles. The 
sessions started simultaneously and were run fully computerized. The participants were led to 
believe that the experiment is a study concerning young adults in East Germany conducted by 
scientists and journalists, and they were asked to read short descriptions of people from 
different social classes to form impressions about them, and to answer some questions 
afterwards. After the introduction of the two target persons, the participants were asked to 
form an impression of the targets. Each participant saw 16 positive, 16 negative, and 16 
neutral behaviour descriptions about the physician or the same segmentation of behaviour 
descriptions about the prostitute in random order for 6 seconds each. Participants in the load 
condition had to press the space bar whenever a randomly generated tone occurred. After the 
retention interval of 30 minutes the participants were surprisingly asked to accomplish a 
recognition task. The 48 behaviour descriptions shown in the presentation phase and 48 
distractors appeared one at a time on the screen. By clicking the old or new buttons the 
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participants had to decide whether the behaviour description has been displayed before or not. 
If, on the other hand, they declared the item as new the next behaviour description appeared.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15. Example of the presentation of the physician-target-person with the behaviour description 
for the old/new decision task 
 
After the classification as old the particular item was presented on both sides of the 
screen and the participants were asked to specify the original screen position with a mouse 
click on the behaviour description on the left or the right screen side (see Figure 15). 
Subsequent to the memory task the participants were instructed to estimate the amount 
of positive and negative items shown about the target persons in the presentation phase. 
Finally, they were asked to answer some biographical questions, were thanked, paid, and 
received a debriefing email. 
Data analysis A multinomial model for source monitoring for data analysis as 
described in the 1st Experiment was employed with the following parameters: D for item 
memory; b for item guessing; d for source memory, and a for source guessing. The 
parameters for the detection of new items were set equal with the according item detection 
parameter. The remaining multinomial model of source monitoring without a separation for 
valence contained the following source memory parameters: d x | consistent and d x | inconsistent; 
where d x | consistent denotes source memory for the negative information about the prostitute 
and positive information about the physician, d x | inconsistent reflects source memory for negative 
information about the physician and positive information about the prostitute. Here, the 
variable x represents the two load conditions: load vs. no load. Comparable specifications 
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were made for item detection parameters: D x | y  (where x denotes cognitive load; y denotes 
consistency), the item guessing parameters: b x | y and the source guessing parameters: a x | y. 
This resulted in a satisfactory well fitted model for the complete data (χ²(8) =7.18, p<.52) and 
the phase separation (Phase 1: χ²(8) = 4.21, p<.84; Phase 2: χ²(8) = 4.30, p< .84; Phase 3: 
χ²(8) =8.33, p<.4).  
According to the introduced hypotheses no difference between consistent and 
inconsistent item detection parameters and only a general load effect were expected. It was 
also assumed that there is no difference between the consistent and inconsistent source 
detection parameters without cognitive load. But under cognitive load an inconsistency 
advantage should appear. Additionally, it was supposed that the inconsistency advantage for 
source memory will decrease over the presentation phases. So the following model 
restrictions for all phases were tested:  
 
a) D load | y   = D no load | y 
b) D x | consistent = D x | inconsistent 
c) d load | consistent = d load | inconsistent 
d) d no load | consistent = d no load | inconsistent  
 
Additionally source memory in phase one against source memory in phase three in the 
load condition was tested:  d y | z   =   d y | z 
 
5.3.3 Results and discussion 
 
Item Memory The hypothesis of equal cognitive load parameters for item memory (a) 
finds no support in the full data (Δχ²(2) =24.47, p<.05) and phase one (Δχ²(4) =48,54, p<.05), 
which can be observed in Table 3. This result is consistent with the findings by Ehrenberg and 
Klauer (2005) and the assumption that the load manipulation is a sufficient task demand. In 
phase two and three the parameters approximated equality and no differences between item 
memory for load and no load could be found anymore. The hypothesis of equality for 
consistent and inconsistent item information (b) is supported by the complete data (Δχ²(2) 
=1.90, p>.05) and for phase one, two, and three (see Table 3 for all ratio statistics). 
Altogether, the assumption of general load effects on item memory which have no effects on 
memory for consistent and inconsistent item information is supported by this experiment (see 
Figure 16 and 17).  
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  General         Phase one           Phase two         Phase three  
 Δχ² df Δχ² df Δχ² df Δχ² df 
a) 24,47* 2 48,54* 2 1,32 2 2,50 2 
b) 1,90 2 0,22 2 0,86 2 1,48 2 
c) 0,75 1 4,37* 1 0,05 1 0,07 1 
d) 0,28 1 1,12 1 0,14 1 0,33 1 
Note. * p< .05 
Table 3. Values of Δχ² for sub-models of the Multinomial Memory Model for Experiment 2. 
 
Source memory The equalisation of the consistent and inconsistent parameters for 
source memory under full cognitive capacity (d) does not worsen the model fit significantly, 
neither in the full data model nor in the individual phases. In contrast, the equalisation of the 
source memory parameters for the load condition (c) results in a significant inconsistency 
advantage only for phase one (Δχ²(1) = 4, 37, p<.05; see also Figure 16 and 17) but not for 
the remaining phases and the whole data – despite the significant load effect on item memory. 
These findings are in part compatible with the assumption of the EFM (Sherman et al., 1998, 
2004) that perceptual/contextual details of inconsistent information receive particular 
attention under conditions of cognitive load.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16. Item and source memory in Experiment 2 (full data) as a function of cognitive load  
and consistency between target person and item information. 
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Figure 17. Item and source memory in Experiment 2 (phase 1) as a function of cognitive load  
and consistency between target person and item information. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18. Consistent and inconsistent source memory under conditions of cognitive load.  
Comparison of phase one and three of the 2nd experiment 
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The prediction of decreasing consistency disadvantage during the presentation phases 
was tested by equalisation of the particular consistent parameters and the inconsistent 
parameters between phase one and two (Δχ²(1) = 1, 65, p=.2), two and three (Δχ²(1) = 1, 65, 
p=.48), and one and three (Δχ²(1) = 4, 01, p<.05). The results show a significant difference 
between phases one and three, which can be attributed to the significant growth of the 
memory for consistent source information between phase one and three (Δχ²(1) = 4, 02, 
p<.05; see also Figure 18).  
 
 
5.3.4 Summary 
 
The encoding flexibility model and the hypothesis of adapted anticipation are in part 
supported by the results of Experiment 2. The detected inconsistency advantage, that was only 
attestable in the first presentation phase but not in the remaining two phases and the general 
condition, indicates a diminishing inconsistency effect. This effect is not a mere consequence 
of increasing cognitive capacities. This is reflected in the results for the whole data, where 
significant cognitive load effects on item memory do not rub off on source memory. 
Nevertheless, diminishing cognitive load effects remain a possible explanatory factor for the 
diminishing of the inconsistency advantage in general.  
The assumption regarding cognitive-load-dependent inconsistency resolution find no 
support in the data because there is no difference in item memory for consistent and 
inconsistent information and on the other hand there is an inconsistency advantage for 
contextual details of inconsistent information even under conditions of cognitive load.  
 The documented results of a decreasing source memory advantage are also in contrast 
with the findings and assumption by Sherman et al. (1998) and Mulligan (1998; Mulligan & 
Hartman, 1996), claiming that the encoding of perceptual information is generally unaffected 
by cognitive load processes, but stand in line with the assumption of the EFM that the 
different memory for perceptual details is a consequence of less attention for contextual 
details if consistent information is presented. One constant in this experiment was the 
impairment of the contextual encoding for consistent information, a fact that may be 
explained by a more conceptual processing (Sherman et al., 1998; Wigboldus, et al., 2003, 
Wigboldus, et al., 2004). That this is primarily an encoding and only secondarily a memory 
effect is reflected in the varying results for presentation phases. The assumption by Sherman 
an colleagues (1998) that saved attention resources are shifted away from the encoding of 
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consistent information and will be directed towards the encoding of perceptual details seems 
not to be required in this context because of the presentation independent of consistent and 
inconsistent items. But the needlessness of this assumption of the EFM remains to be tested 
experimentally. 
In sum, the findings could imply that inconsistency advantages in encoding are indeed 
a consequence of inconsistency resolution and individuation/expectancy adaptation processes, 
which are hardly impaired by cognitive load. They can also be the result of the decreasing 
predictive value of the systematically varying and task irrelevant contextual information. That 
there is no change in item memory but in source memory over the presentation phases speaks 
for the latter hypothesis: no inconsistency resolution and no individuation take place but 
attention is directed towards any diagnostically useful detail in case of decreasing fit of 
expectation and perceived information.  
The decreasing fit of expectation and actual behaviour can be misinterpreted as an 
argument in favour of the inconsistency resolution/individuation assumptions. Although, this 
does not hold because there is no consistency advantage in item memory under cognitive load 
– which is usually predicted by inconsistency resolution/ assumptions – and no change over 
the impression formation process in item memory without load. The latter is usually expected 
in individuation hypotheses. The initially higher attention towards seemingly diagnostic 
contextual information of stereotype-inconsistent behaviour and the initially weak but 
increasingly better memory for the contextual details of stereotype-consistent information 
speak for an inconsistency advantage that is actually a consistency disadvantage in context 
memory. This endorses the speculation that the participants – in search for meaning and order 
– increasingly consider also the contextual information of consistent behaviour as valuable for 
categorization attempts – regardless of cognitive load. 
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5.4 Experiment 3 
 
5.4.1 Introduction 
 
Experiment 1 and 2 revealed inconsistency advantages for item and source memory as 
well as irrelevant context information particularly under cognitive load as predicted in part by 
the EFM. Sherman et al. (1998; 2004) explain the inconsistency advantages in context 
memory with a stronger, automatic perceptual/contextual focus towards inconsistent 
information and the storage of perceptual details for later inspection. But the previous 
experiments revealed a significantly diminished consistency disadvantage (in item and source 
memory) in the last segment of the impression formation process, which can be interpreted in 
three different ways as a cognitive load independent  
 
1. -consequence of individuation (individual organization of perceived 
impressions directly linked to the target person) 
2. -consequence of inconsistency resolution (explaining and melting inconsistent 
information with prior stereotypical anticipation)  
3. -adaptation strategy in search for diagnostic information triggered by the bad 
fit of expectation and actual behaviour.  
 
The meaning of the terms individuation and inconsistency resolution is very complex 
but crucial for the present experiments. There are two levels of inconsistency resolution and 
individuation in the process of impression formation. Traditionally, the experimental 
investigation of “individuation” and “inconsistency resolution” refer to the processing of just 
one piece of information. But inconsistency resolution and individuation can also be 
understood otherwise – as accumulation and integration of information over time. 
Furthermore, inconsistency resolution and individuation can lead to a decreasing value of the 
primed social category as a basis for behaviour interpretation. Generally, better memory for 
the target person in combination with inconsistent item information, such as found in 
Experiment 1 speaks for an individuation effect as supposed by Macrae et al. (1999): This 
means a stronger integration of single pieces of information into a particular picture of a 
person rather than the attachment to categorical instances. The diminishing consistency 
disadvantage in item, source, and context memory also indicates an increasing inconsistency 
resolution and therefore the decreasing explanatory value of the primed social category. These 
assumptions encourage the prediction of increasing memory for the target person during a 
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longer impression formation process – if initially presented together with inconsistent 
information.  
 
Following considerations concerning the impact of cognitive load on perception and 
memory for persons (Brewer, 1996; Macrae et al., 1999), a weak and continuously 
diminishing memory for inconsistent behaviour of a target person over the presentation phase 
is presumed if inconsistency resolution or individuation under load is expected to be 
impaired.  
 
The EFM assumes only an automatic attention reallocation process towards the 
context of inconsistent information under conditions of scarce cognitive resources. Sherman 
and colleagues (Sherman et al., 1998; Sherman et al., 2004) found better memory for 
irrelevant details of inconsistent behaviour descriptions under cognitive load. Ehrenberg and 
Klauer (2005) documented a better memory for the target person if descriptions of 
inconsistent behaviour were presented under load and interpreted their results as evidence for 
the validity of the EFM.  
 
According to the assumption of the EFM and parts of the results of the previous 
experiments, the hypothesis would be that – if the inconsistency advantage under load is a 
consequence of a nonstrategic attention reallocation process -  memory for the target person 
and  irrelevant context information will be of the same quality under conditions of scarce 
cognitive resources and for inconsistent item information as found in the 1st and the 2nd 
Experiment. In the sense of encoding flexibility as an automatic attention reallocation process 
there should be no change of the memory quality for irrelevant details of inconsistent 
information over the impression formation process. 
 
Taking the meaning-seeker-hypothesis and the previous results of this dissertation into 
account it appears to be plausible that the advantages in source and context memory are the 
consequence of a strategic-meaning-seeking process initiated by the confrontation with 
disrupted expectancies and weak fit of social categories and behaviour. The diminishing fit of 
target person and primed social category and the differences between consistent and 
inconsistent information during the impression formation process should initially lead to an 
inconsistency advantage for seemingly diagnostic information, such as the screen position, 
that diminishes (irrespective of the cognitive load) during the impression formation process.   
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The third experiment was designed to present both target persons, according to the 
paradigm by Ehrenberg and Klauer (2005) – according to Experiment 1 – together with the 
behaviour descriptions on both screen positions as in Experiment 2. After the presentation 
phase and the retention interval the memory for each target person and the screen position 
was inquired.  
 
5.4.2 Method 
 
The 3rd Experiment has a 2 (concurrent task: load vs. no load) x 2 (source: physician 
vs. prostitute) x 2 (screen position: left vs. right) x3 (target valence: positive, negative, 
neutral) x 3 (presentation phase: first 20 items, second 20 items, third 20 items) mixed design 
with repeated measures on the last three factors.  
Participants 167 students at the Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena/ Germany were 
given 7 € for their participation in Experiment 3. The experiments were run in sessions of a 
maximum of five participants. Twenty-five participants had to be removed from the analysis 
because of software errors. The remaining participants were randomly assigned to the 
cognitive load condition so that 74 participants were in the no load condition and 68 
participants in the load condition. 
Materials Both female target persons and the same 48 items introduced in Experiment 
1 plus 12 additional positive, negative, and neutral items were now presented to each 
participant. Item order, screen position, and item valence/target person combination were 
randomized, so that a positive item served as a consistent item for the physician and the same 
item served – for a different participant – as an inconsistent item or distractor for the 
prostitute and vice versa. 
In all, 60 items were presented about both target persons, the prostitute and the 
physician, 10 positive, 10 negative and 10 neutral behaviour descriptions about the prostitute 
and the same number of positive, negative and neutral behaviour descriptions about the 
physician.  
The items were presented one at a time on the left or right screen position below the 
picture of each target person and. The presentation on the left or the right screen position was 
randomized and there were no correlations between the screen position and the valence of the 
target item. The items were presented so that 5 positive items about the prostitute appeared on 
the right side of the screen and 5 items appeared on the left side. This applies for all target 
person/valence/screen position combinations. The locations of and distances between the 
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photos and the behaviour description were identical to the second experiment. In the memory 
task the behaviour descriptions were first presented in the centre of the screen like in the 
second experiment. After the old /new-decision the behaviour descriptions were presented on 
both screen positions below the pictures of both target persons. The distance between the 
target persons amounted to 2cm. Four centimetres below each behaviour description on the 
left and on the right were two buttons with 4cm width and 1,5cm height and 1cm distance 
between each other and 3cm to the left or right screen edge labelled “Prostitute” and 
“Physician” so that altogether four clickable buttons were visible.  
Again, cognitive load was manipulated with a combination of a vigilance task and the 
eight-digit-memory task as described in Experiment 2. The retention interval task was also the 
same as in Experiment 1.  
The items were presented in such a way that the presentation phase could be separated 
into 5 sections of 12 valence (3) x target person (2) x screen position (2) combinations. In 
each section one of each possible combination of valence, target person, and screen position 
was presented. In the partition of the three presentation phases the equability constraints of 
the item proportions made it necessary to separate the presentation phases into 24 first items 
and 24 last items – instead of a 20+20+20=60 design. In the experiments before distances of 
16 to 16 to 16 (sum 48) items were used. The evaluation of the 12 first items was refused 
because of many zero valued cells in the frequency tables.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 19. Example of the presentation of the screen position and target person recognition task 
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Procedure At their individual arrival participants were seated into single cubicles. The 
sessions started simultaneously and were run fully computerized. The participants were asked 
to form impressions of two women, a physician and a prostitute. After the presentation of the 
60 behaviour descriptions and the retention interval, participants were asked to classify the 
items from a randomized pool of 60 previously presented and 60 distractor items as old or 
new. After the classification as old the particular behaviour description was presented on both 
sides of the screen. Additionally, the pictures of both target persons were presented above the 
behaviour descriptions. The participants were now asked to specify the original screen 
position and the target person with one mouse click on one button indicating the employment 
of the target person. There were four buttons indicating the employment, two on each screen 
side below the presented behaviour description (see Figure 19).  
After the memory task participants were instructed to estimate the amount of positive 
items about the prostitute and the negative items shown about the physician in the 
presentation phase. Afterwards they were asked to rate the target persons on several trait 
dimensions. Finally, they had to fill in biographical data, were thanked, paid, and received a 
debriefing mail. 
Data analysis A multinomial model for multidimensional source information based on 
the multinomial model for crossed source information (Meiser & Bröder, 2002) was 
employed in the analysis of the current data. This multinomial model is an extension of the 
standard unidimensional multinomial models and as well as hierarchically nested or partial 
models for more than one source dimension (Riefer, Hu, & Batchelder, 1994). It is especially 
applicable to simultaneously presented source dimensions. In addition to the multinomial 
source monitoring model described and used in the previous experiments there are also item 
and source detection probability parameters as well as guessing parameters for two sources. 
Some basic psychological assumptions are connected with this model. It is assumed that the 
memory for one source dimension is not independent from the other in the sense that the 
recollection of one dimension may trigger the recollection of the other. Additionally, it takes 
different guessing strategies into consideration, so, that the guessing parameters of the first 
dimension are not independent from the guessing parameters of the second dimension.  
The parameter D in the multinomial model presented in Figure 20 denotes the 
probability of item and distractor recognition. If the items of a special source combination  
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Figure 20. Example of the multinomial model for crossed dimensions of source information with target 
person 1(T_1) and background 1 (B_1) as root sources  
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were not identified as old or new with the probability 1-D, they are guessed old with 
the probability b and new with the probability 1-b.  
If the items were identified, the source information from the first source dimension is 
recollected with the probability d1. If the first source dimension is recollected, the source for 
the second source dimension is recollected with the probability d2. If the first source 
dimension was not identified with the probability 1-d, the second source is recollected with 
the probability e2 and not recollected with the probability 1-e2. If the second source 
dimension was recollected with the probability e, the first source of the first source dimension 
is guessed with the probability a1. The second source of the first source dimension is guessed 
with the probability 1-a1.  
If neither the first nor the second source dimension were recollected, the first source of 
the first source dimension is guessed with the probability a1 and the first source of the second 
source dimension with the probability a2. The second source of the first source dimension is 
guessed with a probability 1-a1 and the second source of the second source dimension is 
guessed with 1-a2. 
If the items or the distractors were not identified, they are guessed old with the 
probability b and new with the probability 1-b. If items or distractors were guessed old, the 
first source of the first source dimension is guessed with the probability g1. If the first source 
for the first source dimension was guessed with the probability g1, the first source of the 
second source dimension is guessed with the probability g2 and the second source of the 
second source dimension is guessed with the probability 1-g2. The second source of the first 
source dimension is guessed with the probability 1-g1 and if so, the first source for the second 
source dimension is guessed with the probability g2 and the second source is guessed with the 
probability 1-g2.  
Differing from the original model by Meiser and Bröder (2002) the memory 
parameters for distractor item detection were set equal to the item detection parameters. The 
parameters for the probability of remembering a source on the second dimension, given that 
source on the first dimension is not remembered (parameter e2), were set equal with the 
memory parameter for the second dimension given the source was remembered d2. The 
source guessing parameters (parameter g1 and g2) - reflecting the probability that the items 
were not identified but guessed old and therefore the sources were also guessed - was set 
equal with the source guessing parameters under the precondition that the items were 
recollected (parameter a1 and a2).  
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This resulted in a model with ten degrees of freedom, which revealed the following fit 
statistics for the whole data (see Table 4 for an overview): negative items under load: χ²(10) 
=11,43, p=.325; negative items with no load: χ²(10) =16,35, p=.09; positive items under load:  
χ²(10) =15,93, p=.1; and positive items with no load: χ²(10) =7.55, p=.67.  
For the first 24 items the model shown the following fit statistics: Negative items 
under load: χ²(10) =17,7, p=.06; negative items with no load: χ²(10) =12.08, p= .28.; positive 
items under load:  χ²(10) =20.75, p= .02.; and positive items with no load: χ²(10) =7.33, p= 
.69. For the last 24 items the model revealed the following fairly well fit statistics: Negative 
items under load: χ²(10) = 4.09, p=.94; negative items with no load: χ²(10) = 9.77, p= .46; 
positive items under load:  χ²(10) =11.17, p= .34; and positive items with no load: χ²(10) = 
9.01, p= .53.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. χ² and p values with 10 degrees of freedom for the multinomial model of Experiment 3 for the 
complete presentation, phase 1 and phase 3. 
 
 
The hypotheses were as follows: An inconsistency advantage for context information 
particularly in the first presentation phase was assumed. Where the assumptions by Macrae 
and colleagues (1999) predict a consistency advantage for the target person under load, the 
assumptions and results by Ehrenberg and Klauer (2005) predict an inconsistency advantage 
for the target person. Where the EFM suggest an inconsistency advantage for both the target 
person and the irrelevant context information (as a consequence of automatic attention 
reallocation under load that remains stable over the impression formation process) the 
meaning-seeker-assumption states an inconsistency advantage for both the target person and 
the context information as consequence of a strategic search for the reasons for the 
inconsistency. In sum, it is expected to find an inconsistency advantage for irrelevant context 
information and the target person. Moreover, it is assumed that this inconsistency advantage 
will be different for the various presentation phases.  
     Full      Phase 1     Phase 3 
        χ²    p        χ²   p        χ²   p 
Negative Load 11,43 .33 17,7 .06 4,09 .94 
 No load 16,35 .09 12,08 .28 9,77 .46 
Positive Load 15,93 .1 20,75 .02* 11,17 .34 
 No load 7,55 .67 7,33 .69 9,01 .53 
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These assumptions were tested by model restrictions of the multinomial model for 
crossed source information. A good fit of the whole model is supposed if the χ²-distributetd 
goodness-of-fit-index G² is not significantly different from zero. It is assumed that an impact 
of the theoretical constructs behind the parameters is reflected in difference between the 
corresponding parameters so that the statistical equation of two parameters leads to a 
significant deterioration of the model. According to the hypotheses the assumption was tested 
that the probability of the detection of an item or a distractor for consistent and inconsistent 
items is of the same quality (manifested in the first equation below a). Further, the assumption 
was reviewed that the source memory for the target person is equal for consistent and 
inconsistent information for all conditions (equation b) and that the source memory for  
irrelevant context information is the same for consistent and inconsistent information 
(equation c).  
Because of the extraordinary complexity of the model the assumption for the 
conditions of the presentation of negative items under load, of positive items under load, of 
negative items without cognitive load, and positive items without cognitive load and again for 
the differences between the whole data, Phase 1, and Phase 3 were tested separately.  
 
a) D consistent = D inconsistent 
b) d target person | consistent = d target person | inconsistent 
c) d context | consistent = d context | inconsistent 
 
5.4.3 Results and discussion 
 
Item Memory A previous test (as a kind of manipulation check for the cognitive load 
task) of the load/ no load differences in item memory revealed significant differences for the 
whole data but the analysis of the phases failed because of an ill-fitting multinomial model 
after equalisation.  
The hypothesis of equality for consistent and inconsistent item information (a) is 
supported by the data in all conditions (valence, load, phases) except the no load/positive 
condition for the whole data, where we find a small inconsistency advantage (Δχ²(1) =4.04, 
p<.05; see Table 5 for all ratio statistics). For phase one, also a substantial inconsistency 
advantage in the load negative condition (Δχ²(1) =12.39, p<.05; see Figure 21) was revealed.  
 
 
63 
 
 General Phase one  Phase three 
a) Δχ² Δχ² Δχ² 
Load / negative 1.77 12,39* 2.51 
No load / negative 1.07 .53 .01 
Load positive 2.68 n.e. 0 
No load / positive 4.04* 3.81 .17 
b)    
Load / negative 2.53 .71 2.37 
No load / negative 0 .3 .76 
Load positive .85 n.e. .94 
No load / positive .05 .3 .14 
c)    
Load / negative 3.93* 4.45* .28 
No load / negative .86 .69 .12 
Load positive .77 n.e. 1.67 
No load / positive 1.02 .85 1.29 
Note: n.e.= no evaluation possible 
 
Table 5. Values of Δχ² for sub-models of the Multinomial Memory Model for Experiment 3 degrees of 
 freedom = 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 21. Item-, person- and context memory in the load condition of Experiment 3 as a function of negative 
consistent and inconsistent item information and presentation phase 
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Figure 22. Item-, person- and context memory in the no-load condition of Experiment 3 as a function of negative 
consistent and inconsistent information and presentation phase  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 23. Item-, person- and context memory in the load condition of Experiment 3 as a function of positive 
consistent and inconsistent information and presentation phase 
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Figure 24. Item-, person- and context memory in the no-load condition of Experiment 3 as a function of positive 
consistent and inconsistent information and presentation phase  
 
 
Source memory The separation of memory for the target person and memory for the 
context (c) resulted in significant inconsistency advantages for the context in the load/negative 
condition of phase 1 (Δχ²(1) =4.45, p<.05) and for the whole data (Δχ²(1) =3.93, p<.05).4 
Although the values for memory of the target person (b) in the load negative condition lie in a 
critical array they even do not reach significance (see Table 5) yet. The memory for the target 
person in general is very good and oscillates in the region of .9 whereas the memory for  
context information ranges from .3 to .5., a fact that speaks for a ceiling effect. In direct 
equation tests of the load vs. no load conditions no significant differences were found neither 
for memory of the target person nor memory of irrelevant context information. 
  
5.4.4 Summary 
 
Despite the fact that the highly complex multinomial model for crossed source 
information was combined with nonetheless complex experimental conditions it was possible 
to obtain some fundamental findings. The well-known inconsistency advantage turned out to 
be a consistency disadvantage for the irrelevant context information, again. This effect also 
appeared for the first segment of the impression formation process but not the last, where 
66 
 
memory for consistent information reached equivalence with inconsistent information, which 
is normally very stable on a high level. These findings are very well compatible with the 
EFM. However, the disappearance of the inconsistency advantage in the last part of the 
impression formation process – as found twice before – and the lack of a difference in 
memory for the target person’s consistent versus inconsistent behaviour in direct comparison 
argue against the assumption that the inconsistency advantage is the consequence of an 
arbitrary and rather automatic attention reallocation process.  
The improvement of memory for consistent information during the impression 
formation process, as found also in the 1st and the 2nd Experiment, supports the assumption 
that a social category leads the encoding of information in the initial part of the impression 
formation but the bad fit of behaviour and social category encourages meaning-seeking- 
strategies. 
It is important to note, that the findings are tainted with some major limitations which 
reduce their potential for generalization. The combined complexity of the research question 
and the multinomial model required the distribution of tests to several steps. The difference in 
memory for consistent and inconsistent information also resembles a difference between the 
target persons because the direct comparison was only made in one of both valence domains 
combined with one of both cognitive load conditions.    
Hence, the negative information about the physician compared to negative information 
about the prostitute leading to better memory for irrelevant context information such as screen 
position under load speaks in part for the EFM – although it has to be state that this effect is 
limited to negative information conditions if information about more than one person is 
presented. This could be interpreted with the complex competitive character of the given task: 
forming an impression of two oppositely stereotyped target persons compared to only one 
person. The fact that there is no significant difference for the memory of the target person 
suggests that the storing of contextual details of inconsistent information is not an automatic 
process that counts for every single piece of perceptual/contextual information as suspected 
by Sherman et al. (1998, 2004). Maybe the obtrusiveness of contextual information has to be 
considered as an explanation for the unexpected stereotype inconsistency advantage in 
inconsistency resolution attempts. The degradation of the stereotypical label of the target 
person is suggested by the vanished difference between memory for perceptual details of 
consistent and inconsistent information in the last segment of the impression formation 
process. A possible objection, that the context may have served as special indication for the 
67 
 
difference between consistent and inconsistent information does not explain the inconsistency 
advantage in the initial segment of the encoding process.  
Memory for the target person being remarkably good during the impression formation 
process indicates an excellent ability of the participants to differentiate between the target 
persons and an individuation of the behaviour descriptions from the first impression onward – 
but, unfortunately, it does not allow any conclusion concerning load effects on inconsistency-
based individuation. The collected data also revealed an inconsistency advantage for item 
information in a (positive) no load condition and in a negative/ load condition suggesting a 
tendency for enhanced encoding of inconsistent information independent from any cognitive 
load manipulation. This indicates, that if expectations originating from social categories are 
violated (i.e. bad fit), the motivation to find a meaning for the violation will remain unaffected 
by cognitive load.  
A main limitation for the freehanded interpretation of the findings in favour of the 
adapted anticipation strategy remains the objection that the influence of cognitive load on the 
encoding process decreases over time, also regarding the findings of a significant 
effectiveness of the load manipulation only for unsegmented data.  
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5.5 Experiment 4 
 
5.5.1 Introduction 
 
The results of first three experiments may be interpreted in the frame of the 
assumptions of the encoding flexibility model but with some main limitations. Consistent 
with the EFM an inconsistency advantage was found that applied to completely irrelevant 
context information as predicted by the EFM. Consequently, it can be assumed that the 
inconsistency advantage – or better the consistency disadvantage – for irrelevant context 
information under scarce cognitive resources is the consequence of an automatic attention 
reallocation process. But the disappearance of this inconsistency advantage/consistency 
disadvantage in the last part of the impression formation process – as found twice before – 
and the formerly attested lack of any difference in memory for the connection of the target 
person and her consistent versus inconsistent behaviour in the direct combination of the two 
source dimensions speak against the assumption that the inconsistency advantage is a 
consequence of an involuntary, automatic attention reallocation process.  
Another interpretation of the inconsistency advantage may be the general search for 
meaning and guidance in a complex and apparently unpredictable world. One dimension of 
guidance is categorisation. If categorisation fails, people start to search for an explanation for 
the failure of their categorical expectations and try to develop an alternative categorisations 
and predictions of upcoming information. In the context of the present experimental paradigm 
people may develop hypotheses about the presentation of the behaviour descriptions on 
different screen positions, in particular when they are surprised by this kind of presentation of 
information. Participants may conclude that there is a meaningful connection between the 
behaviour descriptions and the presentation on different screen positions. Particularly under 
conditions of scarce cognitive resources the screen position may serve as prediction for the 
inconsistency of the behaviour if the prediction by the target person’s social category fails. 
However, if the participants are explicitly informed of the manner of presentation on 
different screen positions and the arbitrary character of valence of the behaviour descriptions 
they may not include the irrelevant context information into their meaning seeking 
considerations. Additionally, if the participants are told to expect different kinds of behaviour 
descriptions they may not develop any kind of inconsistency advantage at all. 
These questions were tested by informing the participants at the start of the experiment 
that the behaviour descriptions will be shown on different screen positions and that this is an 
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attention focussing requirement. In a second condition the participants were informed of the 
fact that the valence of the behaviour description is unrelated to the screen position. 
  
According to the EFM, the inconsistency effect for irrelevant context information will appear, 
despite the explicit information, because of the automatic, nearly instinctive character of the 
attention reallocation process described by Sherman and colleagues (1998) and Förster and 
colleagues (2004). Following the meaning-seeker-hypothesis, the inconsistency advantage in 
source memory will disappear as a consequence of previous instructions, because the latter 
causes the context information to lose its predictive value.  
 
5.5.2 Method  
 
The 4th experiment 2 (source: physician vs. prostitute) x 2 (screen position: left vs. 
right) x3 (target valence: positive, negative, neutral) x 3 (presentation phase: first 16 items, 
second 16 items, third 16 items) mixed design with repeated measures on the least three 
factors. 
Participants 62 students at the Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena/ Germany were given 
7 € for their participation in the Experiment 4. The experiments were run in sessions of a 
maximum of five participants.  
Materials and Procedure Materials and procedure were exactly the same as in 
Experiment 2 with two small exceptions. After the general introduction of the target person 
the participants received special information of the following wording:  
 
Condition 1: “To stabilise and to focus your attention to the particular behaviour description 
they will be presented alternately on a right and on a left screen position. Earlier studies in 
person perception revealed, that automatic focussing can be optimized by changing the 
positions.” 
 
Condition 2: “Because of that the behaviour description will be randomly assigned to a screen 
position. The content of the behaviour description is not connected to the screen position”  
 
The participants were randomly assigned to both conditions so that 31 participants 
were in Condition 1 and 31 participants in the Condition 2. 
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Furthermore, direct comparison of load and no load conditions was omitted because of 
the constriction of the inconsistency advantages in source memory to load conditions. 
Subsequentially, all participants received a cognitive load exposure.  
Data analysis Exactly the same multinomial model as in Experiment 2 was employed 
and this resulted in a model that fitted satisfactorily well for the complete data of Condition 1: 
χ²(4) =2.45, p<.65 and Condition 2: χ²(4) =5.14, p<.27, and also for the phase separations 
particularly for condition one phase one: χ²(4) =2.27, p<.69.  
It was assumed that there is a consistency disadvantage for the source memory in both 
conditions – particularly for Phase 1. The inconsistency advantage was expected to decrease 
over the presentation phases. It seems also quite plausible to expect a consistency 
disadvantage for item memory – as discovered in Experiment 1 and 3.  
So we tested the following restrictions for all phases and conditions  
 
a) D consistent = D inconsistent 
b) d consistent = d inconsistent 
 
5.5.3 Results and discussion 
 
Item Memory A significant consistency disadvantage for item memory in Phase 1 of 
condition 1 (Δχ²(1) =12.93, p<.05; see Table 6) was discovered. In all other conditions and 
phases including the whole data were no differences discernible, even in comparison tests of 
the phases 1 and 3 were only minor but no significant differences detectable (Δχ²(1) =3.61, 
p=.06).  
Source memory For source memory we found no significant differences.  
Source guessing One totally unexpected result was the inconsistency advantage for 
source guessing. Accordingly, the following post hoc effects were tested: 
 
c) a consistent = a  inconsistent  
 
 They revealed significant inconsistency advantages for the presentation phases 1 and 
3 and the whole data in condition 1 but not for condition 2 and phase 2 in condition 1. These 
unexpected results may be explainable in the context of the semantic processing of the 
information and the strategic information processing.  
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Figure 23. Item and context memory in Experiment 4 as a function of consistency and presentation phase in 
Condition 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 24. Item and context memory in Experiment 4 as a function of consistency and presentation phase in 
Condition 2 
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  General Phase one Phase two Phase three 
a 1,20 12,93* 1,18 0,61 
b 1,00 0,65 0,46 0,01 
c 8,10* 5,69* 2,82 4,69* 
          Note. * p< .05; 
Table 6. Values of Δχ² for sub-models of the Multinomial Memory Model for Experiment 4 and df=1. 
 
 
5.5.4 Summary 
 
Taking these final results into account, the hypothesis concerning the automaticity of 
the attention allocation process is supported. It can be concluded that the awareness towards 
contextual details of inconsistent information is not necessarily an automatic process without 
the perceiver’s awareness as assumed by Macrae (1994), Sherman (1998) or Förster (2004) 
but rather hypothesis directed. Noticeable contextual circumstances will be considered, may 
they be irrelevant to the personal impression formation or not and regardless of cognitive 
load. Presumably, the effect is motivated by the desire to explain unexpected information and 
to allow a cue-guided recategorisation, i.e. the adaptation of the continuous anticipation. If 
irrelevant context information is ostensibly introduced as a functional purpose, the awareness 
towards these details becomes consistency-independent. However, memory for inconsistent 
behaviour descriptions is enhanced in the primary phase and disappears in the latter phases. 
This consistency disadvantage – which is unfortunately not significant in direct comparison of 
the phases 1 and 3 – can be reckoned another support for the assumption, that recategorisation 
or individuation takes place during the impression formation and that the anticipation is 
continuously adapted.   
In conditions where the independence of the content of behaviour descriptions and 
context information is frankly introduced (Condition 2), the previously found advantage for 
contextual details of inconsistent information is absent again and previously discovered 
inconsistency advantages in item memory disappears. One explanation for this disappearance 
may be the mention of the fact that the behavioural information contains variable meaning. 
Unfortunately, the results lack some explanatory power as a result of the omission of 
the direct experimental re-test of variables like default conditions (Experiment 2) without 
instructions and cognitive load within Experiment 4.   
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6 General discussion 
 
6.1 Overview 
 
The main aim of this doctoral thesis was the investigation of the encoding and memory 
for expectancy consistent and inconsistent information under circumstances of scarce 
cognitive resources in order to test the encoding flexibility model (Sherman et al., 1998) and 
to take a look at the characteristics of the process of impression formation as an adapted 
anticipation. The hypotheses were developed within the theoretical framework of the different 
understandings of a social perceiver as an efficiency expert (Sherman et al., 2004; Sherman et 
al., 2000; Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2001) compared to the concept of the social perceiver as a 
meaning seeker (Spears & Haslam, 1997; Nolan et al., 1999; Oakes & Turner, 1990). In 
search for a better model of the social perception process the application of cognitive load was 
a frequently used paradigm. A previously presented stereotype in combination with cognitive 
load led to the enhanced application of stereotypes (Gilbert & Hixon, 1991; Bodenhausen, 
1990; Bodenhausen & Lichtenstein, 1987; Macrae et al., 1994) and therefore a stereotype-
consistent information advantage in encoding, judgement, and memory. Nevertheless, there 
are findings of no effect of cognitive load on stereotyping as a consequence of a poor fit of 
stereotype and behavioural information (Nolan et al., 1999) and findings of the enhancement 
of memory for context details of stereotype-inconsistent information even under cognitive 
load conditions (Ehrenberg & Klauer, 2005; Sherman et al., 2004). Together with 
assumptions of shifted categorization and subtyping in the face of disconfirming exemplars of 
a stereotyped social category (Kunda & Oleson, 1995) these findings raise two main 
questions. 
 
At first: Whether a stereotype is an independent cognitive instrument, which we can 
freely choose to use or not to use or if stereotyping is an inevitable characteristic of human 
nature.  
 
And secondly: Whether the application of a given stereotype is an inevitable, 
automatic process, primarily occurring under circumstances of scarce cognitive resources, or 
if the stereotypical perception process is strategically and dynamically adapted to the relevant 
information in search for meaning – relatively unaffected by demands of cognitive load. 
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Relying on the widely used person perception paradigm employing the presentation of 
a set of behaviour descriptions about a target person belonging to a highly stereotyped social 
category at first it was hypothesized that, according to the encoding flexibility model 
(Sherman et al., 1998), the memory for irrelevant details should be better for stereotype-
inconsistent information than consistent information. Secondly, it was hypothesized that this 
inconsistency advantage diminishes during the person perception due to a continuous 
expectation adaptation process in the face of the increasingly weaker fit of the stereotype 
connected with the social category of the target person and the highly contradictory 
behavioural information.  
Contrary to Sherman and colleagues (Sherman et al., 1998; Sherman et al., 2004)  
systematically peculiar but irrelevant perceptual details of inconsistent information are not 
assumed as automatically and passively stored for later inspection but strategically used to 
make sense of the perceived environment. The increasingly diminished memory difference for 
perceptual details presented together with consistent and inconsistent information was 
expected to be a consequence of an individuation/inconsistency resolution process, which – 
contrary to Macrae and colleagues (Macrae et al., 1994) – is independent from the presence of 
additional tasks. Associated with these primary theoretical considerations were secondary 
hypotheses especially tested with the different arrangements of the four experiments 
discussed hereafter. 
 
The primary aim of the 1st experiment was the replication of results by Ehrenberg and 
Klauer (2005), who were able to show an advantage in memory for a target person if 
stereotype-inconsistent behavioural information was presented under cognitive load. 
Ehrenberg and Klauer interpreted their results referring to the encoding flexibility model 
(Sherman et al., 2004), where it is assumed that perceptual context information of inconsistent 
behaviour is stored in memory for later inspection in cases of sufficient resources. The 1st 
experiment of this dissertation was guided primarily by these assumptions with the additional 
investigation of data on different impression formation stages, with different amounts of 
information and increasingly stereotype contradictive behaviour indicating a weak fit of social 
category of the target person, and her behaviour (Nolan et al., 1999).  
Surprisingly, the predicted inconsistency advantage in memory was not only found in 
source memory but also for item memory and even under conditions without cognitive load. 
These effects were strongly valence-dependent, indicating that the presentation of two target 
persons leads to contrasting effects. The supposed disappearance of the inconsistency 
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advantage for source memory was statistically not confirmed but the initial consistency 
disadvantage in item memory vanished in the 2nd and 3rd stage of the impression formation 
process. These results raise the question if the adopted cognitive load manipulation was 
appropriate for the paradigm even though the manipulation check – the general effect of 
cognitive load on item memory was significant – showed the anticipated results in the first 
two stages. The replication of parts of the experiments carried out by Ehrenberg and Klauer 
poses the question if the assumption of a shift of attention from consistent towards 
inconsistent information in presence of a stereotype under cognitive load is a necessary 
supposition. The advantage in memory for perceptual details of inconsistent information is 
not necessarily bound to an attention-split-process because consistent and inconsistent 
information did not stand in direct competition for attention.  
Inconsistency advantages in source memory under load argue against the assumption 
by Macrae and colleagues (1999) that inconsistency advantages are consequences of the act of 
individuation – because individuation is understood as very resource-consuming. The 
assumption that inconsistency advantages are a consequence of a basic attention shift towards 
perceptual details of inconsistent information cannot yet be decided after the first experiment, 
because the individuation assumption did not prove completely wrong. A diminishing 
memory advantage for inconsistent behaviour of target persons and a very good memory for 
the target person in general could be an indication for an act of load-independent 
individuation and inconsistency resolution during the impression formation process. The 
remaining consistency disadvantage in source memory in all stages of the impression 
formation process does not necessarily indicate a general attention shift to mere perceptual 
details of inconsistent information. On the contrary, the load effect on consistent rather than 
inconsistent information (even under cognitive load conditions) maintains the individuation 
assumption within the framework of the meaning-seeker-hypothesis proposing a load-
independent search for accuracy in social perception.            
  
The main aims of the 2nd experiment were the test of the encoding flexibility model 
with non-semantic information and the replication of the diminishing of the memory 
advantage for inconsistent information. Experiments by Sherman and colleagues (Sherman et 
al., 2004; Sherman et al., 1998) tested the assumptions concerning the inconsistency 
advantage in perceptual memory with a priming paradigm of pattern recognition. However, 
the presented behaviour descriptions were not independent information but allowed a direct 
inference from words to behaviour. Therefore, one aim of the 2nd experiment was to test the 
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assumptions of the EFM with a slightly altered experimental design including the presentation 
of only one target person and contextual information that was completely independent from 
the behaviour descriptions.  
The findings by Ehrenberg and Klauer (2005) raised the question if the encoding of 
perceptual context information under conditions of constrained attention resources was an 
effect that was not automatically directed to current contextual details of the information but 
could be interpreted as resource independent individuation. In order to test the assumption of 
the EFM that source memory advantage is a general inconsistency effect under scarce 
cognitive resources and not due to cued recognition oriented on the target person or the 
behaviour description itself, completely non-semantic and behaviour-description-independent 
information was presented. In order to see if there is a load-unaffected individuation during 
the person perception process, the inconsistency effect differences in three successive 
segments of the impression formation were investigated.  
The results of the 2nd experiment confirmed the hypothesis of memory advantages for 
independent and irrelevant contextual details of inconsistent information under conditions of 
scarce cognitive resources as predicted by the EFM. Contrary to the assumptions of the EFM 
the direct competition of consistent and inconsistent information for attention was not a 
necessary prerequisite. Furthermore, the hypothesis of diminished source memory advantage 
also received support by the results of Experiment 2. That this decrease of the difference 
between stereotype-consistent and inconsistent information is attributable to the increasing 
memory for contextual details of consistent information supports the assumption that there is 
a motivation for the integration of the any useful information in a mental representation of the 
present information particularly in confrontation with bad fit of the social category of the 
target person and the behavioural information. This implies that there is indeed a search for 
meaningful information that allows for alternative categorisation and new predications about 
the presented information. To the same degree as stereotypical information associated with 
the primed social category becomes less reliable as a tool for predictions about the target 
person, alternative explanations come into the focus of attention.                
 
The main objective of the 3rd experiment was to test the general validity of the EFM 
accounting for an automatic attention reallocation process for different kinds of contextual 
information. According to the EFM and the findings of Sherman and colleagues (1998), 
Ehrenberg and Klauer (2005), and the previous findings and replications of this dissertation 
project, the memory for contextual details is independent from the content of this context 
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information. However, there are cases when context details become less relevant for 
information processing and memory. If the target person ceases to be a useful reference 
because of her entanglement with an increasingly worthless social category, conspicuous and 
systematically varying contextual details start to be taken into account as a pseudo-useful 
resource for desired recategorisation and adapted anticipation.  
In order to test the assumption of the EFM that source memory advantage is a general 
and automatic attention reallocation effect and not directed to (pseudo)-relevant information 
strategically in order to allow a cue guided recategorisation, the memory advantage for 
inconsistent information presented with the target person and with completely unrelated 
information was surveyed. And again, in order to see if there is a load-unaffected 
recategorisation during the whole person perception process, the inconsistency effect 
differences in three successive segments of the impression formation were investigated.  
The results of the 3rd experiment are multilayered not least because of the highly 
complex experimental design. The general results indicate a diminishing inconsistency 
advantage in memory for irrelevant source information but not for the target person. The very 
good load independent source memory speaks for an individuation. The increasing memory 
for contextual details of consistent information – as documented in Experiment 2 – again 
supports the assumption of a cognitive attempt to find a useful instrument for recategorisation. 
Again, there was a strong valence-dependent inconsistency advantage such as previously 
detected in Experiment 1. This indicates an attempt in the differentiation of the target persons.  
 
The 4th experiment elaborated on the findings the findings of the Experiment 2 with an 
additional test of the assumption suggested by the EFM regarding increased attention towards 
irrelevant contextual details of inconsistent information as a result of an automatic, hence not 
strategic, attention reallocation process. If this is an inevitable process resulting from 
presenting stereotype-inconsistent information it must be independent form any prior 
knowledge or speculation about the possible relatedness of behavioural and contextual 
information.  
In order to test these assumptions the original design of Experiment 1 was expanded 
by one small detail: Participants were directly informed about the irrelevance of the 
contextual information for the impression formation process. The first instruction informed 
the participants of the arbitrary presentation of the behaviour descriptions at different screen 
positions, and the second instruction made it absolutely clear that there was no connection 
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between the valence of the behaviour descriptions and the presentation at a particular screen 
position.  
It appeared that already the first instruction concerning the – alleged - function of the 
presentation at different screen positions was sufficient for the complete disappearance of any 
inconsistency advantage in source memory. Only a small inconsistency advantage for item 
memory in the first phase of the segmented impression formation process left some room for 
the assumption of an individuation process. Unfortunately, the results lack full explanatory 
power because the experiment was not a direct replication of Experiment 2. Hence, one can 
only make an informed guess about the impact of the direct instructions about the arbitrary 
character of irrelevant contextual information, which are most likely to cause independent 
encoding of the behavioural and the contextual information. This proves to be correct that the 
attention reallocation towards contextual details of inconsistent information is not an 
inevitable, automatic process but rather a strategic process in search for meaning and useful 
categories, which allow the prediction of upcoming information.  
Altogether, despite the substantial limitations of the experimental paradigm, the 
statistical analysis and the comprehensive results the main hypotheses were predominantly 
supported. The first hypothesis predicted that with lesser cognitive capacity (more cognitive 
load) the memory for irrelevant perceptual details of stereotype-inconsistent information is 
enhanced in comparison to the memory for the perceptual details of stereotype-consistent 
information. The results of the first, second and third experiment confirm this assumption.  
The second hypothesis predicted that with an increased amount of information the 
initial memory advantage for perceptual details of inconsistent information under cognitive 
load disappears during the impression formation process. The effect of an initial inconsistency 
advantage in the first phase of the impression formation process that diminishes at least in the 
last phase was found in the first, second and third experiment. A direct test of the memory 
increase for consistent information only yielded significant results in the second experiment. 
The third hypothesis predicted that the particular initial attention for contextual details 
of inconsistent information is omitted, if the context information is described as arbitrary and 
unconnected to the behaviour descriptions. To test this hypothesis was the main aim of the 
fourth Experiment and it appeared that the addition of a small detail (such as the instruction of 
the arbitrary screen position) resulted in the disappearance of the inconsistency advantage for 
contextual details of inconsistent information found in all previous experiments.  
In synopsis, these results allow for a carefully considered integration of the theoretical 
assumption made in advance.   
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6.2 Strengths and limitations of the presented experiments 
 
In this dissertation it was attempted to show that the models of stereotypes as flexible 
and efficient tools are limited by the assumptions that categorization and stereotyping are 
necessary components of human information processing and that the social perceiver is 
predominantly a meaning seeker while the efficiency expert comes a close second. 
Inconsistency advantages in memory for behavioural information under conditions of 
cognitive load and memory for irrelevant contextual detail of inconsistent information – even 
in long term memory – speak for the employment of meaning-seeking-strategies as primary 
instruments of social cognition. The quick abandoning of a different encoding of irrelevant 
contextual details as a consequence of the knowledge about their arbitrary character does also 
support the notion of an efficiency expert. So far, the discussed experiments do indeed not 
allow any final conclusion on the meaning-seeker vs. efficiency-expert-debate but provide an 
interesting insight into the functioning of a stereotypical impression formation process.  
Moreover, the presented experiments suggest an extension of the assumptions of the 
EFM. A direct test of the long-term memory for semantically independent information 
combined with the behaviour description is a significant advancement of the investigations of 
the EFM. The repeated replication of the memory advantage for perceptual details of 
stereotype-inconsistent behavioural information, independent from parallel presentation of 
consistent and inconsistent information and that the shift of attention resources not necessary 
being a prerequisite of the inconsistency effect are other important result of the present 
experiments.  
The direct investigation of the impression formation process, the segmentation of its 
course, and the finding of a disappearing inconsistency advantage over the impression 
formation process are further crucial advancements of the present study. Unfortunately, herein 
lie also its largest problems. Not only is the disappearance of the impact of the load 
manipulation not eliminated as an alternative interpretation for the effect of increasing context 
memory for consistent information. Additionally, the difference in source memory between 
the segments is not a result of a systematic experimental manipulation but an observation of 
the intrapersonal variations. However, the repeated observation of stable phenomena is 
nonetheless valuable, particularly because they were hypothesis driven and they encourage 
further experimental investigation.  
Another limitation of the explanatory power of the present findings is the restriction of 
the consistency differences in memory in Experiment 1 and 3 to behaviour descriptions with 
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special valences. The behaviour descriptions were not separately analyzed for each target 
person but mixed. Therefore the inconsistency advantage for negative information cannot be 
clearly separated for each of the two target-persons. Consequentially, there is an inconsistency 
advantage for the negative information of the one target person compared to the negative 
information about the other.  
 It is also noteworthy that the effects of inconsistency advantages are not restricted to 
source memory but were also found in item memory – even a diminishing inconsistency 
advantage was found in item memory. But this finding must not necessarily be interpreted as 
a disadvantage, but as an indication for the diminishing value of the primed stereotypical 
label.  
 Despite the major limitations of the present study, some consistent results, such as the 
repeated finding of the predicted inconsistency advantages in source memory under 
circumstances of cognitive load and the diminishing of this effect, allow the cautious 
assumption that there is a reason for the advanced source memory and it might be an 
intensified search for discriminative features. 
 
6.3 Theoretical links to stereotype change research 
      
The assumption of an intensified search for and use of discriminative features in 
confrontation with disconfirming exemplars was recently investigated with nonsocial 
information by Deutsch and Fazio (2008). They found an increased attention towards features 
relevant to the identification of exceptions. Not only that, participants increasingly learnt to 
discriminate between the different classes of stimuli.  
Stereotype change is traditionally described by three well-established models. The 
bookkeeping model and the conversion model (Rothbart, 1981) assume that the perceiver 
essentially tallies up confirming versus disconfirming information and modifies the stereotype 
accordingly, in a data-driven way (bookkeeping) or until a threshold amount of disconfirming 
information has been encountered (conversion). The subtyping model (Brewer, Dull, & Lui, 
1981) assumes that the treatment of disconfirming information depends on the structure of 
that information. Strongly counterstereotypic individuals are grouped into a new subtype that 
is differentiated from the rest of the group. Slightly counterstereotypic individuals are 
assumed as affecting the perception of the whole group.  
All these models are difficult to apply to the stereotype driven person perception 
process of only one or two individuals because they presuppose the perception of more than 
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one category member at a given instant. But nevertheless, there are links in the explanation of 
the obstruction of the stereotype change process. Most notably, the assumed possibility of 
subtyping on the basis of irrelevant features of disconfirming exemplars of a social category 
(Kunda & Oleson, 1995) highlights increased attention for potential discriminative features in 
presentation with stereotype-inconsistent information. Recent research in subtyping and 
bookkeeping (Queller & Smith, 2002; Deutsch & Fazio, 2008) also illustrated the dynamics in 
the learning process of stereotype change and postulated that a change is most likely with 
moderately disconfirming exemplars. This is consistent with the assumption of a 
recategorisation of an ongoing impression formation process: If the inconsistent information 
is only slightly deviant and alternates with stereotype confirming information, a substantial 
shift of stereotypical anticipation is not necessary. Strongly associated, similar stereotypical 
expectations are applied – whereas with a declining fit of social category and behavior the 
need for discriminative features rises and the categorization is shifted accordingly. This 
highlights the importance of as many typical and (slightly) disconfirming exemplars as 
possible (Richards & Hewstone, 2001; Hewstone, Hassebrauck, Wirth, & Waenke, 2000).  
The main focus of the present doctoral thesis was on general cognitive motivations for 
accuracy of the mental representation compared to the need for an economic information 
processing and the role of these opposing tendencies in stereotype change. However, even 
accuracy and economics is susceptible to individual motivational differences and situational 
circumstances. Individual prejudice (Wyer, 2004), ingroup identification (Hutchison & 
Abrams, 2003) or situational demands like future accountability (Paolini, Crisp, & McIntyre, 
2009) certainly influence accuracy as well as processing load management and thus 
stereotype change tendencies.    
 
6.4 Future research 
 
The investigation of stereotyping as a process with the particular potential to facilitate 
dynamic changes of the stereotypical expectation is widely neglected and practically 
nonexistent (Kunda et al., 2002; Kunda et al., 2003). In the detailed analysis of stereotyping 
processes under particular circumstances lies a major benefit for the understanding of 
adaptive changes in categorisation and the beneficial mechanisms of stereotype change. 
Important questions were raised with the procedural approach to stereotyping and we are only 
just beginning to answer them yet. The present dissertation allows only an initiatively view on 
the processing of stereotype-consistent and inconsistent information. The hypothesis of the 
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social perceiver as a – predominantly – strategic meaning seeker received some support, 
whereas the status of the efficiency expert is not yet solved.  
The Experiments produced the expected results, which were partly in accordance with 
the EFM but also posed questions of automaticity regarding the attention reallocation process 
and of the necessity of the divided attention division between stereotype-consistent and 
inconsistent information. Answering the question if this automatic attention reallocation 
process is a necessary or just a sufficient condition of the encoding flexibility is a potential 
task for further research on the EFM. An additional account within the framework of the EFM 
worth the investigation is a procedural change in the supposed memory advantage for 
conceptual meaning of consistent information.  
Another important role plays the different amounts and kinds of cognitive load. Future 
investigations should recognize the limited generalizability of particular effects of different 
manipulations of cognitive load (Nolan et al., 1999). Associated with this question is the 
observed but not systematically tested decreasing effect of cognitive load over the course of 
the impression formation process. This major objection against the recategorisation 
assumption can in fact be refused by parallel effects of cognitive load on item memory. 
However, the diminishing cognitive load effects leave room for alternative explanations of the 
diminishing source memory. Hence, the application of different manipulations of cognitive 
load would be a promising procedure. The investigation of impression formation processes 
concerning larger groups i.e. the combination of the “Who said what” paradigm with the 
person-perception paradigm (Klauer & Wegener, 1998) could contribute to the understanding 
of subtyping and stereotype change.  
Finally, the stronger consideration of the perception process, the attention shift 
mechanisms, variations in motivation, memory and judgement depending on different 
amounts of consistent and inconsistent information, will allow a deeper understanding of the 
complex nature of the stereotyping process.    
 
6.5 Conclusion 
 
A flower pot falling from a roof in front of us, a person wearing a pompous hat, or a 
politician talking of tax cuts after the election – we sometimes find ourselves in situations, 
where we perceive something we did not expect. Our reaction is often surprise, we may be 
frightened, or sometimes we laugh, because the element of surprise – or expectancy 
incongruency as we could also call it – is one basic determinant of humour. The observation 
83 
 
of unexpected circumstances (for example person behaviour) often leads to curiosity (on our 
part) and an increased involvement in the particular situation combined with a desire to 
understand it – to solve the perceived inconsistencies. Many things/ impressions that we 
would at first describe as bizarre, grotesque, or suspicious can at the same time stimulate our 
curiosity or arouse our interest. Whole industries and advertisement in particular, rely on the 
curiosity effect of exceptional information, strange behaviour, or jokes. 
Surprise as reaction to unexpected information requires a certain expectation to work. 
The frequently occurring everyday situations with a surprise element, in which we perceive 
expectancy inconsistent information often in a subliminal way, suggest an innate tendency to 
continuously anticipate future events. Furthermore, it implies that this continuous anticipation 
is permanently adapted by the integration of new information, thus creating a constant 
“stream of anticipation”. We can ask, what is the underlying motivation for curiosity as 
reaction to the confrontation with unexpected information? It is the human want for 
comprehension, i.e. the desire to understand an incident. But what does “understanding” 
mean? “Understanding” stands for prediction. And predictability is the ability to (further) 
anticipate a future situation in the ever-changing present. 
The process of dealing with inconsistencies is said to comprise several aspects, such as 
explaining inconsistencies “away” (Förster, Higgins, & Werth, 2004), instigating a causal 
reasoning process (Hutter, & Crisp, 2005) and/or to integrating contradictory information 
within an established knowledge structure (Pendry & Macrae, 1999) all of them expressing 
the notion “inconsistency resolution”. It has been suggested that this inconsistency resolution 
may be impaired by the force of cognitive load (e.g., Garcia-Marques & Hamilton, 1996; 
Srull & Wyer, 1989). Findings in favour of the memory for inconsistent information are 
expected to yield opposite results when cognitive load is implemented in the experimental 
design.  
Better or worse memory for inconsistent information is mostly investigated by direct 
comparison of both memory measures (consistent vs. inconsistent), but rarely by exploring 
the particular consistency domain itself and its change with the impression formation process. 
Researching these aspects might have clarified the assumptions about different kinds of 
information directly competing with each other.  
Another hypothesis yet to be fully investigated assumes an inconsistency advantage 
(based on an inconsistency resolution) which will be impaired by cognitive load, but not 
necessarily a consistency disadvantage which might also be stronger under cognitive load.  
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These reflections are incorporated in the EFM: Under cognitive load we will find a 
consistency disadvantage in memory for the special domain of perceptual/contextual details 
of the particular information. On the other hand it is expected that there is a consistency 
advantage in the encoding of conceptual information.  
What is not considered by the EFM is the potential change of expectations during the 
impression formation process so that the differences between both memory domains 
disappear. Even the vertically (meaning a particular occasion, a point in time) inhibited 
inconsistency resolution and individuation process may evolve their power horizontally (on 
many occasions, pieces of behavioural information) during the process of impression 
formation, so that formerly consistent information is no longer clearly consistent and 
inconsistent information no longer necessarily inconsistent. 
Some researchers assume that the inconsistency-related attention reallocation towards 
perceptual details is an evolution-based (Sherman, 2001) or neuronal-based (Förster, Higgins, 
& Werth, 2004), nearly inevitable, automatic vigilance process which might not be impaired 
but sometimes triggered by cognitive load, somewhat contradicting the notion of the 
assumptions of strategically controlled processing of inconsistent information. Together with 
Sherman and colleagues it is assumed that participants have a better memory for meaningful 
but unrelated contextual details of inconsistent information, but the explanation of this effect 
differs from the explanation by Sherman and colleagues. In this dissertation thesis it is 
assumed that contextual information is not passively stored in memory for “later use” but 
always processed and consulted to explain the inconsistency and hence to adapt the 
anticipation of the upcoming information - which is not necessary for consistent information. 
Here global strategies are at hand such as spontaneous trait inferences and corresponding 
guessing, which potentially loses its impact with less referential value of the stereotypical 
label.  
Many consistency advantages can be explained by guessing strategies. Similarly, 
spontaneous trait inference (Wigboldus et al. 2003, 2004) can be understood as an attempt to 
simplify the situation at the momentary expense of accuracy and preferably under conditions 
of cognitive load. But the encoding accuracy can increase during an impression formation 
process because it simply has to if the previous expectations do not fit the stereotypic label 
anymore. 
Researchers in the field often use tool metaphors for stereotypes („energy-saving 
devices“ Macrae et al., 1994; “Among the handiest tools in the social perceiver’s kit”, Gilbert 
and Hixon ,1991, p. 509; “The Knife that cuts both ways”, Dijksterhuis, & van Knippenberg, 
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1996; “Flexible cognitive tools” Sherman, et al., 2004), but considering all the information we 
have about the facts of stereotyping, in stereotyping ourselves we misidentify the flexible 
encoder as a craftsman. Because “Stereotypes work as enlightening gestalts as they supply 
perceivers with extra information” (Yzerbyt, Corneille & Estrada, 2001) and may therefore 
serve as a very powerful and inevitable cognitive processing demand. And stereotypical 
labels, often misunderstood as “stereotypes”, may only serve as – sometimes misguiding – 
guideposts for the stereotypical anticipation and individual information enrichment process. 
 
When we walk a street where once a flower pot fell from a roof in front of us, we 
certainly remember the contextual details of this expectancy inconsistent information. We 
remember the streets, we remember the houses. But what we experience as memory is in fact 
ongoing anticipation. The search for explanations of exceptional events in memory is indeed 
an act of recategorisation or adapted anticipation. When we try to find a (alleged) contextual 
cause for this extraordinary incident, we may come to the conclusion that some “higher 
power” or “god” caused the flower pot to fall down in exactly that moment when we walked 
this particular patch of the street. Since these overgeneralised pseudo-explanations miserably 
fail in every instance and particularly in the explanation of falling flower pots and never 
enable the person experiencing such an event to either foresee or explain the world better than 
in the first place, further investigation search of the surroundings appears promising. It is 
beneficial because it yields a recategorisation, i.e. an adapted anticipation of the formerly 
common street. We could for example realise, that the house the flower pot fell from is an old 
people's home, hence we are able to generalise the experience not to streets in general but to 
re-stereotype streets with homes for the elderly as dangerous “flower-pot-streets”.  
It is reasonable not to change the overall expectation of streets and not to collect a 
huge amount of individual expectations for exceptions of common streets but to permanently 
look – hypothesis guided – for reasonable causes and their regularities in events or even to  
experimentally test them if possible, disregarding any parallel load. This allows the optimal 
continuous anticipation of and the adjustment to the regular world we live in and to exclude 
any superstitious or even “transcendent” supernatural “explanations”.       
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Summary 
 
The present dissertation is concerned with encoding of and memory for information 
that do or do not meet previously raised expectations or live up to them. The main focus of 
this dissertation is on the perception and recollection of certain information which are 
congruent or incongruent in reference to given social-stereotypical data.  
Prominent hypotheses concerning stereotypic-schematically information processing 
assume that this is primarily motivated by the demand to save scarce cognitive resources. 
Contrary to this position is the assumption that stereotypic-schematically information 
processing is inevitable and that stereotypic-schematically cognition primarily follows a need 
for a coherent mental representation. A cognitive-load-independent correction of schematic 
expectations in cases of low fit between a stereotype and individual behavioural information 
must be possible, presumably with the aid of contextual information.  
The encoding flexibility model (EFM) by Sherman and colleagues (1998) assumes a 
better memory for contextual details of stereotype-inconsistent information under 
circumstances of additional cognitive load compared to the memory for contextual details of 
stereotype-consistent information. Simultaneously, memory for the conceptual meaning of 
stereotype-consistent information is improved. Sherman and colleagues explain their results 
with a flexible stereotype-driven attention management as a consequence of cognitive load, in 
the sense of modeling of stereotypes to become tools for saving cognitive resources.  
The continuum model of person perception (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990) considers 
recategorisation or individuation as a consequence of failed confirmatory categorisation – in 
case of stereotype-inconsistent information. This recategorisation happens with the aid of 
“emergent attributes” (Kunda et al., 1990), which can be semantically irrelevant. 
Recategorisation and individuation are considered as dependent on sufficient cognitive 
resources (Yzerbyt et al., 1999; Macrae et al., 1999). 
In cases when stereotypic-schematically cognition is corrected independently of 
available resources the memory advantage for perceptual details of stereotype-inconsistent 
information should diminish during the perception process. 
To test these assumptions four experiments were conducted. The results support the 
assumption that encoding flexibility indicates the attempt to achieve appropriate 
recategorisation. The findings by Ehrenberg and Klauer (2005) and their replication in 
Experiment 1 included in this research allow the supposition that the advantage in context 
memory for stereotype-inconsistent information is just simply an individuation effect. This 
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effect is facilitated by the cued recall of the target person because of the stereotypical 
knowledge about the behavior descriptions. A similar memory advantage for contextual 
details of stereotype-inconsistent behavior was also documented for stereotype independent, 
non-semantic information. That speaks for an automatic attention reallocation in the sense of 
the encoding flexibility model. The disappearance of the memory advantage for the person 
with the simultaneously reappearing memory advantage for the irrelevant contextual 
information in Experiment 3 together with the disappearance of memory advantages with the 
overt instruction concerning the arbitrary character of the contextual information in 
Experiment 4 argue for a strategically search for relevant information for the purpose of a 
recategorisation. 
The idea of a recategorisation process is further supported by the reduction or even 
complete vanishing of a memory advantage for contextual details of stereotype-inconsistent 
information during the impression formation process. However, the effects described above 
should rather be interpreted as the reduction or even disappearance of a consistency 
disadvantage than a diminishing of an inconsistency advantage, because memory for 
contextual details of consistent information increased to a level comparable to the one for 
inconsistent information. Altogether, this suggests receding stereotypical expectations.  
Taken all the results from the experiments carried out in the course of this dissertation 
project together, it can be concluded that stereotyping is best described as a resource-saving 
information processing strategy. But the primary task of this strategy is adequate information 
processing in conformity with reality rather than mere resource saving, as widely assumed. 
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Zusammenfassung 
 
Die vorliegende Dissertation befasst sich mit der Enkodierung und der Erinnerung für 
Informationen, die zuvor erzeugten Erwartungen eines typischen Ereignisverlaufs entsprechen 
oder ihm zuwiderlaufen. Der besondere Schwerpunkt dieser Arbeit lag auf der Wahrnehmung 
und dem Gedächtnisabruf von Informationen, die sich kongruent bzw. inkongruent einer 
sozial-stereotypen Erwartung gegenüber zeigen. 
Prominente Hypothesen über die Funktion der stereotyp-schematischen 
Informationsverarbeitung gehen davon aus, dass diese in erster Linie dem Zweck der 
effektiveren Nutzung begrenzter kognitiver Ressourcen dient. Dem wird entgegengesetzt, 
dass stereotyp-schematische Informationsverarbeitung unvermeidlich sei, denn die Nutzung 
einer bestimmten kategorial-schematischen Kognition basiere vor allem auf dem Bedürfnis 
nach korrekter Informationsverarbeitung. Infolgedessen müsse eine belastungsunabhängige 
Korrektur schematischer Erwartungen im Falle fehlender Übereinstimmung von individueller 
Verhaltensinformation und Stereotyp möglich sein, die unter Zuhilfenahme kontextueller 
Information erfolge.  
Das Modell der Enkodierflexibilität (EFM) von Sherman und Kollegen (1998) geht 
davon aus, dass das Gedächtnis für perzeptuelle Details stereotypinkonsistenter Information 
unter zusätzlicher kognitiver Belastung im Vergleich zu perzeptuellen Details 
stereotypkonsistenter Information besonders erhöht sei, dass sich gleichzeitig jedoch das 
Gedächtnis für den konzeptuellen Gehalt stereotypkonsistenter im Vergleich zu 
stereotypinkonsistenter Information verbessere. Sherman und Kollegen führen dies auf ein 
flexibles, stereotypgeleitetes Aufmerksamkeitsmanagement aufgrund kognitiver Belastung, 
im Sinne der Modellierung von Stereotypen als Instrumente der Ressourcenersparnis, zurück.  
Das Kontinuum-Modell der Eindrucksbildung (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990) sieht vor, dass 
eine Rekategorisierung bzw. eine Individuierung in Situationen fehlgeschlagener 
konfirmatorischer Kategorisierung – z.B. bei wahrgenommener stereotypinkonsistenter 
Information – möglich ist. Die Rekategorisierung kann unter Zuhilfenahme „emergenter 
Eigenschaften“ (Kunda et al., 1990), die semantisch irrelevanter Natur sein können, 
geschehen. Rekategorisierung und Individuierung gelten als abhängig von ausreichenden 
kognitiven Ressourcen (Yzerbyt et al., 1999; Macrae et al., 1999).  
Für den Fall einer ressourcen-unabhängigen Korrektur kategorial-schematischer 
Kognition sollte sich der Gedächtnisvorteil perzeptueller Details stereotypinkonsistenter 
Information im Verlauf des Prozesses der Eindrucksbildung verringern.  
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Zur Prüfung dieser Hypothesen wurden vier Experimente durchgeführt, die zeigen, 
dass das Phänomen der Enkodierflexibilität als ein Ausdruck der Suche nach Anhaltspunkten 
für eine sinnvolle Rekategorisierung verstanden werden kann. Die Ergebnisse von Ehrenberg 
und Klauer (2005) und ihre Replikation in Experiment 1 dieser Dissertation lassen zwar 
einerseits vermuten, dass der Effekt eines Gedächtnisvorteils für perzeptuelle 
Kontextinformation ein reiner Individuierungseffekt sein könnte, der einen „cued-recall“ der 
Targetperson anhand des stereotypen Wissens über die Verhaltensinformation begünstigt. Die 
Tatsache, dass der Gedächtnisvorteil für kontextueller Information stereotypinkonsistenten 
Verhaltens auch bei nicht-semantischen und zu der inhaltlichen Information in keinem 
Zusammenhang stehenden Information auftritt, spricht jedoch für eine automatische 
Aufmerksamkeitsreallokation im Sinne des Modells der Enkodierflexibilität. Die Aufhebung 
des Gedächtnisvorteils für die Person zu Gunsten eines Gedächtnisvorteils für die irrelevante 
Kontextinformation in Experiment 3 und das Verschwinden des Gedächtnisvorteils für 
perzeptuelle Details stereotypinkonsistenter Information im Falle expliziter Instruktion über 
den arbiträren Charakter der Kontextinformation in Experiment 4 sprechen eher für eine 
strategische Suche nach und Integration von relevanter Information zum Zwecke einer 
Rekategorisierung.  
Diese Annahme wird vor allem durch das Phänomen des Nachlassens des 
Gedächtnisvorteils für perzeptuelle Details stereotypinkonsistenter Information im Verlauf 
der Eindrucksbildung gestützt. Dieser Effekt ist allerdings weniger ein Effekt des Nachlassens 
eines Inkonsistenzvorteils, sondern eher ein Nachlassen des Konsistenznachteils. Dass sich 
das Gedächtnis für perzeptuelle Details konsistenter Information auf das Niveau der 
inkonsistenten Information verbessert, spricht für ein Nachlassen der Wirkung einer 
stereotypen Erwartung.  
Zusammenfassend legen die Ergebnisse der vorliegenden Dissertation eher ein Modell 
eines strategischen Einsatzes resourcensparender Informationsverarbeitungsstrategien im 
Dienste einer realitätsadäquaten Informationsverarbeitung nahe, als die Annahme des Primats 
der Ressourcenersparnis.   
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Appendix 
 
Selected itemlist (after Ehrenberg, Cataldegirmen & Klauer, 2001) 
  
1. … stellt andere gern in der Öffentlichkeit bloß. 
2. … lacht mit, wenn andere in Gegenwart von Ausländern rassistische Witze machen. 
3. … läßt den Müll nach einer Party im öffentlichen Park einfach liegen. 
4. … macht sich über die Sprachprobleme von Ausländern lustig. 
5. … nimmt die Probleme anderer nie ernst. 
6. … ist meist zu faul mit anzufassen, wenn ein Rollstuhlfahrer aus dem Bus aussteigen 
möchte. 
7. … betrinkt sich oft auf Feten und wird dann aggressiv. 
8. … setzt eher eine Freundschaft aufs Spiel, als in einem Streit um unwichtige Dinge 
nachzugeben. 
9. … läßt andere nie aussprechen und hört selten genau zu. 
10. … hat sich kaum um die schwerkranke Mutter gekümmert. 
11. … macht oft Witze auf anderer Leute Kosten. 
12. … nimmt sich keine Zeit für die Sorgen anderer, wenn es gerade ungelegen kommt. 
13. … versucht selten, die Ansichten anderer nachzuvollziehen, auch wenn die selbst sehr 
tolerant sind. 
14. … wird mit älteren Menschen schnell ungeduldig. 
15. … hilft nicht, wenn ältere Leute am Bahnhof Schwierigkeiten mit ihrem Gepäck haben. 
16. … ist es egal, ob sich jemand vom Rauchen gestört fühlt. 
17. … ist häufig unehrlich zu anderen, wenn es bequemer scheint. 
18. … wirft Altpapier in den Hausmüll, obwohl der nächste Altpapiercontainer nicht weit weg 
ist. 
19. … erwartet immer sehr überschwenglichen Dank für einen Gefallen. 
20. … hilft dem älteren Nachbarn nie bei der Gartenarbeit, obwohl der schon oft darum gebeten 
hat. 
21. … drängelt sich in Warteschlangen oft einfach vor. 
22. … hält es für unwichtig, an die Geburtstage von Freunden und Verwandten zu denken. 
23. … paßt nur ungern auf die kleinen Kinder der Nachbarn auf, wenn die etwas Wichtiges zu 
erledigen haben. 
24. … liegt nicht viel daran, mit anderen Leuten gut auszukommen. 
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25. … versucht nicht, im Winter sparsam zu heizen, weil die Abrechnung über eine Pauschale 
erfolgt. 
26. … fühlt sich von Spendenaufrufen für Katastrophenhilfe nicht angesprochen. 
27. … erreicht selbst gesetzte Ziele nur sehr selten. 
28. … ist es völlig egal, ob der Hund auf öffentliche Rasenflächen macht. 
29. … hat die Unterschriftenliste für mehr Spielplätze nicht unterschrieben. 
30. … interessiert es nicht, daß auf dem Hausdach Solarzellen angebracht werden könnten. 
31. … sieht es nicht ein, mehr Geld für fair gehandelten Kaffee auszugeben. 
32. … setzt sich lieber vor den Fernseher, als ein gutes Buch zu lesen. 
33. … überholt schon mal rechts auf der Autobahn, obwohl das ziemlich gefährlich ist. 
34. … ist nicht ehrenamtlich tätig, weil es zu lästig ist, etwas für die Gemeinde zu tun. 
35. … kann es nicht leiden, wenn Freundinnen und Freunde überraschend vorbeikommen. 
36. … gibt gerne damit an, wenn etwas besonders gut gelungen ist. 
37. … mag es nicht, wenn Besuch noch jemanden mitbringt. 
38. … gibt Obdachlosen nie etwas, schließlich ist jeder selbst verantwortlich für sein Schicksal. 
39. … verlangt von anderen oft mehr als von sich selbst. 
40. … schmeichelt sich gerne bei wichtigen Leuten ein, auch wenn die unsympathisch sind. 
41. … behält vertrauliche Sachen immer für sich. 
42. … hält sich immer an Geschwindigkeitsbegrenzungen in Wohngebieten, allein der 
spielenden Kinder wegen. 
43. … merkt, wenn andere sich nicht gut fühlen und geht einfühlsam darauf ein. 
44. … hat Gebärdensprache gelernt, als ein Bekannter nach einem Unfall gehörlos wurde. 
45. … setzt sich dafür ein, daß in der Stadt alle wichtigen Gebäude mit Rampen für 
Rollstuhlfahrer versehen werden. 
46. … hat ein gutes Gespür dafür, wenn andere Menschen ein Problem haben. 
47. … übernimmt in letzter Zeit die Treppenhausreinigung für die bettlägerige Nachbarin. 
48. … formuliert Kritik an anderen immer so konstruktiv wie möglich. 
49. … hat noch nie jemanden bei einer Verabredung einfach versetzt. 
50. … spricht nie schlecht über andere hinter deren Rücken. 
51. … geht nie über rote Ampeln, wenn Kinder in der Nähe sind. 
52. … würde nie die Tatsachen verdrehen, auch wenn es Vorteile bringt. 
53. … schickt öfter Hilfspakete mit Lebensmitteln und Kleidung in Krisenregionen. 
54. … nimmt im Bus die Tasche vom Sitz neben sich auf den Schoß, damit andere Fahrgäste 
sich setzen können. 
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55. … hat eine gefundene Brieftasche mit 600 DM darin sofort abgegeben. 
56. … nimmt die eigene Meinung nicht als Maß aller Dinge. 
57. … achtet darauf, Waren mit möglichst wenig Verpackung zu kaufen. 
58. … bietet älteren Leuten im Bus grundsätzlich den eigenen Sitzplatz an. 
59. … kauft ausschließlich Getränke in Pfandflaschen. 
60. … benutzt ausschließlich ökologische Reinigungsmittel. 
61. … wirft Batterien und Medikamente grundsätzlich nicht in den Hausmüll. 
62. … kauft nur Fleisch aus artgerechter Haltung, auch wenn das recht teuer ist. 
63. … spendet Geld für die Rettung bedrohter Tierarten. 
64. … hat schon öfter den Hund von Bekannten in Pflege genommen, wenn die im Urlaub 
waren. 
65. … engagiert sich schon lange in der Jugendarbeit. 
66. … kauft bevorzugt Lebensmittel aus ökologischem Anbau, auch wenn das recht teuer ist. 
67. … wirft Zigarettenkippen selten einfach auf die Straße, auch wenn da ja gekehrt wird. 
68. … kauft Weihnachtsgeschenke meist auf dem Basar der Behindertenwerkstatt, um diese zu 
unterstützen. 
69. … spendet regelmäßig für Umweltschutzorganisationen. 
70. … macht sich nicht hinter dem Rücken von anderen über sie lustig. 
71. … unterhält sich gerne über anspruchsvolle Themen wie Kunst oder Literatur. 
72. … käme nie auf die Idee schwarzzufahren. 
73. … wendet sich nicht von Freunden ab, wenn diese Probleme haben. 
74. … spricht Mißverständnisse offen an, damit sich nicht ein Problem daraus entwickelt. 
75. … gelingt es leicht, gute Laune zu verbreiten. 
76. … macht gerne anderen eine kleine Freude. 
77. … bot einem wohnungssuchenden Freund übergangsweise die eigene Wohnung an. 
78. … leiht einem guten Freund, der in Geldnot geraten ist, schon mal eine kleinere Summe. 
79. … ist bei der Mülltrennung sehr konsequent. 
80. … ist immer pünktlich, auch wenn das manchmal Warten zur Folge hat. 
81. … trinkt morgens lieber Kaffee als Tee. 
82. … ist nicht in Dresden zur Schule gegangen. 
83. … gönnt sich zur Belohnung hie und da einen kleinen Luxus 
84. … mag Zartbitterschokolade. 
85. … ist mit 19 von zu Hause ausgezogen und nach Dresden gekommen. 
86. … setzt sich bei schönem Wetter gerne abends an die Elbe. 
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87. … hat ihren letzten Urlaub an der Ostsee verbracht. 
88. … vergisst manchmal, den Anrufbeantworter einzuschalten, wenn sie aus dem Haus geht. 
89. … hat einen jüngeren Bruder, der in Leipzig wohnt. 
90. … liest sich Verträge gut durch, bevor sie unterschreibt. 
91. … geht gerne auf Flohmärkten auf Schnäppchenjagd. 
92. … kocht nicht gerne für sich allein, sondern holt sich dann meist eine Pizza. 
93. … geht im Sommer gerne ins Schwimmbad um die Ecke. 
94. … hat sich jetzt eine gebrauchte Waschmaschine gekauft, weil der Waschsalon auf Dauer 
doch teuer ist. 
95. … geht in der Woche abends gern mal ins Kino. 
96. … überlegt schon länger, ob sie sich einen Computer anschaffen soll. 
97. … kriegt im Sommer immer einen ziemlich schlimmen Heuschnupfen. 
98. … hat sich im Laufe der Zeit eine große CD-Sammlung zugelegt. 
99. … kauft sich ihre Zeitung meistens morgens am Kiosk. 
100. … interessiert sich nicht für Horoskope oder Astrologie. 
101. … hat sich als Kind für Modellflugzeuge begeistert. 
102. … hätte schon gerne eine größere Wohnung, aber die Mieten sind so hoch. 
103. … sammelt die Kinoposter von ihren Lieblingsfilmen. 
104. … hat vor, über Ostern mit Freunden nach Frankreich zu fahren. 
105. … guckt sich abends manchmal lieber einen Videofilm an statt zu lesen. 
106. … unternimmt am Wochenende eigentlich immer etwas mit ihren Freunden. 
107. … hat in ihrer Jugend viel Sport gemacht. 
108. … holt sich Sonntags immer frische Brötchen von der Bäckerei unten im Haus. 
109. … kann sich gut vorstellen, auch länger in Dresden wohnen zu bleiben. 
110. … legt keinen großen Wert auf eine schicke Wohnungseinrichtung. 
111. … leiht sich hin und wieder Videofilme aus der Stadtbücherei aus. 
112. … schläft am Wochenende gerne lange aus. 
113. … hat schon einmal ihren Schlüssel in der Wohnung liegengelassen und die Tür hinter sich 
zugezogen. 
114. … geht gern am Wochende in Ruhe einkaufen. 
115. … hat sich im letzten Jahr einen neuen Kühlschrank gekauft. 
116. … hätte gern eine Wohnung mit Balkon. 
117. … liest, wenn sie Zeit hat, lange die Tageszeitung. 
118. … geht regelmäßig zu Vorsorgeuntersuchungen. 
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119. … trinkt gern frische Milch. 
120. … geht einmal im Monat zum Frisör. 
 
 
 Answer 
Presentation   Prostitute   Physician          New 
No load Phase 1 Negative Prostitute 65 14 12
Physician 5 79 5
New 9 5 514
Positive Prostitute 73 5 4
Physician 8 72 12
New 9 20 499
Phase 2 Negative Prostitute 65 10 12
Physician 5 73 11
New 9 5 514
Positive Prostitute 67 10 14
Physician 12 64 8
New 9 20 499
Phase 3 Negative Prostitute 63 8 15
Physician 5 70 11
New 9 5 514
Positive Prostitute 72 11 8
Physician 6 72 10
New 9 20 499
Load Phase 1 Negative Prostitute 41 15 25
Physician 6 61 14
New 15 7 474
Positive Prostitute 65 10 11
Physician 14 38 29
New 21 7 468
Phase 2 Negative Prostitute 57 13 16
Physician 2 64 16
New 15 7 474
Positive Prostitute 53 12 15
Physician 16 54 17
New 21 7 468
Phase 3 Negative Prostitute 45 18 18
Physician 11 59 15
New 15 7 474
Positive Prostitute 69 2 11
Physician 7 61 12
New 21 7 468
  
 
Table A 1: Segmented empirical answer frequencies in Experiment 1. 
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                         Answer 
Presentation Prostitute  Physician          New 
No Load Negative Prostitute 193 32 39 
Physician 15 222 27 
New 9 5 514 
Positive Prostitute 212 26 26 
Physician 26 208 30 
New 9 20 499 
Load Negative Prostitute 143 46 59 
Physician 19 184 45 
New 15 7 474 
Positive Prostitute 187 24 37 
Physician 37 153 58 
New 21 7 468 
  
 
Table A 2: Empirical answer frequencies in Experiment 1 (unsegmented data). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                       Answer 
Presentation           Left          Right          New 
No load Inconsistent Left 281 77 74 
Right 103 242 87 
New 13 7 844 
Consistent Left 275 79 78 
Right 91 243 98 
New 14 15 835 
Load Inconsistent Left 245 81 90 
Right 83 228 105 
New 26 31 775 
Consistent Left 235 88 93 
Right 93 230 93 
New 31 29 772 
 
 
Table A 3: Empirical answer frequencies in Experiment 2 (unsegmented data). 
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    Answer 
                
Presentation 
 
          Left         Right          New 
No Load Negative Inconsistent Left 137 38 41
Right 42 126 48
New 2 3 427
Consistent Left 147 41 28
Right 46 129 41
New 4 4 424
Positive Inconsistent Left 144 39 33
Right 61 116 39
New 11 4 417
Consistent Left 128 38 50
Right 45 114 57
New 10 11 411
Load Negative Inconsistent Left 100 38 30
Right 35 89 44
New 6 4 326
Consistent Left 138 53 57
Right 53 139 56
New 18 17 461
Positive Inconsistent Left 145 43 60
Right 48 139 61
New 20 27 449
Consistent Left 97 35 36
Right 40 91 37
New 13 12 311
 
Table A 4: Empirical answer frequencies in Experiment 2 (unsegmented data). 
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 Answer 
Presentation          Left         Right          New 
No load Negative Inconsistent Left 51 12 10
Right 14 48 8
New 2 3 427
Consistent Left 60 8 6
Right 14 51 8
New 4 4 424
Positive Inconsistent Left 49 13 11
Right 18 40 13
New 11 4 417
Consistent Left 47 14 14
Right 13 42 16
New 10 11 411
Load Negative Inconsistent Left 30 12 15
Right 13 25 15
New 6 4 326
Consistent Left 35 20 24
Right 24 40 21
New 18 17 461
Positive Inconsistent Left 49 11 23
Right 11 47 26
New 20 27 449
Consistent Left 29 7 18
Right 16 29 15
New 13 12 311
 
 
Table A 5: Empirical answer frequencies in Experiment 2 Phase 1. 
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           Answer 
Presentation          Left         Right          New 
No load Negative Inconsistent Left 40 14 17
Right 19 31 20
New 2 3 427
Consistent Left 43 18 10
Right 19 38 16
New 4 4 424
Positive Inconsistent Left 41 14 12
Right 25 38 13
New 11 4 417
Consistent Left 35 13 23
Right 17 34 20
New 10 11 411
Load Negative Inconsistent Left 35 14 8
Right 10 37 12
New 6 4 326
Consistent Left 57 16 17
Right 15 44 17
New 18 17 461
Positive Inconsistent Left 46 18 18
Right 19 38 21
New 20 27 449
Consistent Left 34 14 9
Right 14 24 15
New 13 12 311
 
 
Table A 6: Empirical answer frequencies in Experiment 2 Phase 2. 
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          Answer 
Presentation           Left        Right          New 
No load Negative Inconsistent Left 46 12 14
Right 9 47 20
New 2 3 427
Consistent Left 44 15 12
Right 13 40 17
New 4 4 424
Positive Inconsistent Left 54 12 10
Right 18 38 13
New 11 4 417
Consistent Left 46 11 13
Right 15 38 21
New 10 11 411
Load Negative Inconsistent Left 35 12 7
Right 12 27 17
New 6 4 326
Consistent Left 46 17 16
Right 14 55 18
New 18 17 461
Positive Inconsistent Left 50 14 19
Right 18 54 14
New 20 27 449
Consistent Left 34 14 9
Right 10 38 7
New 13 12 311
 
 
 
Table A 7: Empirical answer frequencies in Experiment 2 Phase 3. 
 
112 
 
                                                                                                   Answer 
Presentation       Prostitute     Physician 
   Left      Right   Left    Right  New 
No Load Positive Prostitute Left 49 28 5 2 18
Right 26 80 1 9 18
Physician Left 10 3 69 22 30
Right 5 8 28 62 28
New 20 28 28 19 1385
Negative Prostitute Left 64 30 15 6 21
Right 28 76 8 5 17
Physician Left 2 3 66 20 10
Right 0 3 24 57 16
New 2 4 6 9 1459
Load Positive Prostitute Left 33 13 3 0 19
Right 26 66 5 4 35
Physician Left 8 12 56 21 39
Right 5 14 24 27 66
New 30 37 20 26 1247
Negative Prostitute Left 24 33 15 7 57
Right 17 59 14 9 37
Physician Left 1 2 37 10 18
Right 1 2 20 31 14
New 7 8 21 18 1306
 
 
 
 
Table A 8: Empirical answer frequencies in Experiment 3 Phase 1. 
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  Answer 
Presentation    Prostitute       Physician 
Left   Right      Left Right     New
No Load Positive Prostitute Left 68 31 6 7 26
Right 12 71 1 4 15
Physician Left 1 7 58 13 25
Right 0 7 29 74 26
New 20 28 28 19 1385
Negative Prostitute Left 58 37 8 4 19
Right 15 79 7 6 24
Physician Left 4 2 84 18 31
Right 0 3 36 65 30
New 2 4 6 9 1459
Load Positive Prostitute Left 55 32 10 5 34
Right 11 30 3 0 24
Physician Left 5 1 34 8 20
Right 2 12 31 66 25
New 30 37 20 26 1247
Negative Prostitute Left 56 39 11 5 25
Right 25 67 7 5 32
Physician Left 4 1 73 28 30
Right 4 1 34 74 23
New 7 8 21 18 1306
 
 
 
 
Table A 9: Empirical answer frequencies in Experiment 3 Phase 2 
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 Answer 
Presentation    Prostitute      Physician 
Left   Right     Left Right   New 
No Load Positive Prostitute Left 68 32 8 2 20 
Right 27 77 4 4 21 
Physician Left 3 1 76 25 27 
Right 3 7 18 63 12 
New 20 28 28 19 1385 
Negative Prostitute Left 60 20 5 2 21 
Right 17 58 6 4 20 
Physician Left 3 4 80 20 23 
Right 1 4 33 71 27 
New 2 4 6 9 1459 
Load Positive Prostitute Left 69 36 8 2 21 
Right 17 82 4 5 28 
Physician Left 10 14 65 22 25 
Right 1 6 19 30 12 
New 30 37 20 26 1247 
Negative Prostitute Left 27 17 9 3 12 
Right 12 31 4 9 12 
Physician Left 2 1 71 30 32 
Right 2 1 31 66 36 
New 7 8 21 18 1306 
 
 
 
  
Table A 10: Empirical answer frequencies in Experiment 3 Phase 3 
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                                                                                           Answer 
Presentation    Prostitute       Physician 
Left      Right     Left   Right     New 
No Load Positive Prostitute Left 185 91 19 11 64 
Right 65 228 6 17 54 
Physician Left 14 11 203 60 82 
Right 8 22 75 199 66 
New 20 28 28 19 1385 
Negative Prostitute Left 182 87 28 12 61 
Right 60 213 21 15 61 
Physician Left 9 9 230 58 64 
Right 1 10 93 193 73 
New 2 4 6 9 1459 
Load Positive Prostitute Left 157 81 21 7 74 
Right 54 178 12 9 87 
Physician Left 23 27 155 51 84 
Right 8 32 74 123 103 
New 30 37 20 26 1247 
Negative Prostitute Left 107 89 35 15 94 
Right 54 157 25 23 81 
Physician Left 7 4 181 68 80 
Right 7 4 85 171 73 
New 7 8 21 18 1306 
 
 
 
 
Table A 11: Empirical answer frequencies in Experiment 3 (unsegmented data). 
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 Answer 
     Presentation           Left         Right          New 
Prostitute Negative Left 13 11 21 
Right 7 19 19 
New 1 12 257 
Positive Left 23 9 13 
Right 17 15 13 
New 11 7 252 
Physician Negative Left 29 11 8 
Right 9 28 11 
New 5 5 278 
Positive Left 26 9 13 
Right 5 19 24 
New 11 9 268 
Consistent Left 39 20 34 
Right 12 38 43 
New 12 21 525 
Inconsistent Left 52 20 21 
Right 26 43 24 
New 16 12 530 
 
 
Table A 12: Empirical answer frequencies in Experiment 4, Condition 1 (Phase 1). 
 
 
 Answer 
Presentation            Left         Right           New 
Prostitute Negative Left 27 10 8 
Right 7 28 10 
New 1 12 257 
Positive Left 21 8 16 
Right 12 18 15 
New 11 7 252 
Physician Negative Left 28 10 10 
Right 8 31 9 
New 5 5 278 
Positive Left 25 10 13 
Right 9 31 8 
New 11 9 268 
Consistent Left 52 20 21 
Right 16 59 18 
New 12 21 525 
Inconsistent Left 49 18 26 
Right 20 49 24 
New 16 12 530 
 
 
Table A 13: Empirical answer frequencies in Experiment 4, Condition 1 (Phase 2). 
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 Answer 
Presentation           Left         Right           New 
Prostitute Negative Left 26 14 5 
Right 7 31 7 
New 1 12 257 
Positive Left 30 9 6 
Right 9 25 11 
New 11 7 252 
Physician Negative Left 30 8 10 
Right 10 24 14 
New 5 5 278 
Positive Left 30 9 9 
Right 8 28 12 
New 11 9 268 
Consistent Left 56 23 14 
Right 15 59 19 
New 12 21 525 
Inconsistent Left 60 17 16 
Right 19 49 25 
New 16 12 530 
 
 
Table A 14: Empirical answer frequencies in Experiment 4, Condition 1 (Phase 3). 
 
 
 Answer 
Presentation           Left         Right           New 
Prostitute Negative Left 66 35 34 
Right 21 78 36 
New 1 12 257 
Positive Left 74 26 35 
Right 38 58 39 
New 11 7 252 
Physician Negative Left 87 29 28 
Right 27 83 34 
New 5 5 278 
Positive Left 81 28 35 
Right 22 78 44 
New 11 9 268 
consistent Left 147 63 69 
Right 43 156 80 
New 12 21 525 
inconsistent Left 161 55 63 
Right 65 141 73 
New 16 12 530 
 
Table A 15: Empirical answer frequencies in Experiment 4, Condition 1 (unsegmented data). 
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 Answer 
   Presentation             Left       Right          New 
Prostitute Negative Left 25 14 6 
Right 11 27 7 
New 7 10 253 
Positive Left 27 7 11 
Right 14 21 10 
    New 9 5 256 
Physician Negative Left 29 14 2 
Right 16 21 8 
New 5 6 259 
Positive Left 26 11 8 
Right 11 28 6 
    New 13 8 249 
Consistent Left 51 25 14 
Right 22 55 13 
New 20 18 502 
Inconsistent Left 56 21 13 
Right 30 42 18 
    New 14 11 515 
 
Table A 16: Empirical answer frequencies in Experiment 4, Condition 2 (Phase 1). 
 
 
 Answer 
   Presentation            Left       Right         New 
Prostitute Negative Left 26 10 9
Right 12 24 9
New 7 10 253
Positive Left 23 15 7
Right 13 25 7
    New 9 5 256
Physician Negative Left 26 6 13
Right 8 22 15
New 5 6 259
Positive Left 26 7 12
Right 10 26 9
    New 13 8 249
Consistent Left 52 17 21
Right 22 50 18
New 20 18 502
Inconsistent Left 49 21 20
Right 21 47 22
    New 14 11 515
 
Table A 17: Empirical answer frequencies in Experiment 4, Condition 2 (Phase 2). 
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 Answer 
   Presentation            Left        Right          New 
Prostitute Negative Left 25 11 9 
Right 9 25 11 
New 7 10 253 
Positive Left 26 6 13 
Right 11 21 13 
    New 9 5 256 
Physician Negative Left 22 13 10 
Right 15 22 8 
New 5 6 259 
Positive Left 25 9 11 
Right 15 24 6 
    New 13 8 249 
Consistent Left 50 20 20 
Right 24 49 17 
New 20 18 502 
Inconsistent Left 48 19 23 
Right 26 43 21 
    New 14 11 515 
 
Table A 18: Empirical answer frequencies in Experiment 4, Condition 2 (Phase 3). 
 
 
 Answer 
               Left       Right          New 
Prostitute Negative Left 76 35 24 
Right 32 76 27 
New 7 10 253 
Positive Left 76 28 31 
Right 38 67 30 
    New 9 5 256 
Physician Negative Left 77 33 25 
Right 39 65 31 
New 5 6 259 
Positive Left 77 27 31 
Right 36 78 21 
    New 13 8 249 
Consistent Left 153 62 55 
Right 68 154 48 
New 20 18 502 
Inconsistent Left 153 61 56 
Right 77 132 61 
    New 14 11 515 
 
Table A 19: Empirical answer frequencies in Experiment 4, Condition 2 (unsegmented data).
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